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Recent data from anti-hate organizations finds that pro-White events, propaganda, and 
groups are steadily increasing in the United States. Additionally, large collective actions and 
mass shootings that are racially motivated have become highly visible in the past few years. 
Given social media’s role in both influencing and acting as a platform for the far-right, its impact 
cannot be ignored. Across two studies, this dissertation examines the themes underlying White 
nationalist social media content and its influence on White Americans’ intra and intergroup 
relations. In Study One, a content analysis of videos from five White nationalist YouTube 
channels finds that outgroups are both frequently discussed and mentioned in threatening or 
negative ways. Additionally, these videos regularly include content that references psychological 
mechanisms known to increase collective action intentions in the real world. In Study Two, a 
cross-sectional survey finds that self-reported exposure to social media content containing 
references to White injustice are associated with intentions to engage in collective action to 
improve the status and position of Whites in American society. Further, exposure to White 
injustice on social media has an especially strong influence on the real-world attitudes of 
Democrats. These findings reflect the important role played by digital media in the rise of White 
nationalism in Western nations with multicultural societies.  




Chapter 1: Introduction and the Rise of White Nationalism  
Introduction  
In American society discussions of race are increasingly common in both public and 
political spheres. For example, recent discussions of Critical Race Theory, and whether it should 
be taught in schools, resulted in emotionally charged conversations and school board meetings 
(Ellis & Sanchez, 2021). These events and their associated commentary are frequently discussed 
in traditional forms of media but also digital and social media. For example, public opinion data 
show that 43% of individuals say most or some of the social media posts they see are about race 
or race relations (Pew Research Center, 2016a). Of importance, some of these conversations 
might result in or be centered on content that is explicitly racist. Yet, individuals are less angered 
or disturbed by racist rhetoric compared to the past (Valentino, Neuner, & Vandenbroek, 2018), 
suggesting changing norms with respect to explicit forms of hate speech.  
Social media, due to its unfiltered and unregulated nature, is especially useful in 
perpetuating hateful content targeting marginalized groups (Gaudette et al., 2020). Additionally, 
online platforms can be used to promote perceptions that Whites are treated unfairly or 
disenfranchised, a sentiment increasingly held by many White Americans (Norton & Sommers, 
2011; Pew Research Center, 2019). Pro-White extremist groups have a strong and growing 
presence on social media sites and the content created and disseminated by these groups is 
posited to significantly influence individuals who may intentionally or unintentionally come 
across this content (DeCook, 2018). The increase in access, ease of use, and reach of social 
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media in the last decade has likely contributed to the recent real-world rise in far-right, Alt-
Right, and pro-White ideologies in both the United States and Europe.  
Outside of media, White nationalist groups in the U.S. have increased by 55% since 2017 
(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2020). More recent reports from the Anti-Defamation league find 
that White nationalist incidents doubled in 2020 from the previous year (Anti-Defamation 
League, 2021). The number of incidents is not inconsequential, with 5,125 cases in 2020. Rising 
support for a pro-White ideology is important as it likely contributes to the increase in non-
normative collective actions including violent protests, domestic terrorism, and hate crimes 
motivated by White ideology (Anti-Defamation League, 2019). Recent examples of such 
incidents in the U.S. include the Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting (O’Brien, 2012), the 
Charleston Church shooting in 2015 (Ellis, Payne, Perez, & Ford, 2015), the 2017 Unite the 
Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia (Keneally, 2018), the 2018 mass shooting in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania (Robertson, Mele, & Tavernise, 2018), and the 2019 mass shooing in El Paso, 
Texas (Francescani et al., 2019). Beyond the United States, there are similar incidents reported in 
other parts of the world, including the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooting in New Zealand 
(Perry, 2019) and the 2011 attacks in Norway (Beaumont, 2011). 
Many of the perpetrators of these incidents are reported to have been influenced and 
motivated by digital content created by far-right groups (Perry, 2020). For example, Brenton 
Tarrant (the perpetrator in the Christchurch Mosque shooting) related to officials that he 
regularly used far-right websites like 8chan and found inspiration to commit this act on YouTube 
(Perry, 2020). Additionally, Anders Behring Breivik (the perpetrator in the Norway attack) was 
found to have frequently commented on far-right blogs and forums and was radicalized by 
propaganda on social media (Ravndal, 2013). 
 3 
 In 2020, pro-White propaganda online and offline had a significant impact on American 
society. During the riot at the U.S. Capitol building on January 6th, 2021, social media platforms 
were used to explicitly spread disinformation and organize individuals who collectively aimed to 
“Stop the Steal” of the 2020 U.S. presidential election (Cellan-Jones, 2021). On the day of the 
event, for example, social media allowed users a means to communicate with each other, served 
as a source of information for the best routes to the Capitol to avoid police, and were used to 
provide suggestions on how to break into the building (Frenkel, 2021). Much of this 
communication was posted and shared through the social media pages of the groups that had 
organized the protest (Cellan-Jones, 2021; Frenkel, 2021).  
Social media are of particular importance for the Alt-Right (a group of individuals who 
subscribe to a far-right ideology), as many in this group feel disenfranchised from mainstream 
media and place little trust in it (Forscher & Kteily, 2020). This magnifies, the role of digital 
platforms as a means through which individuals are influenced and exposed to pro-White ideas 
for the first time. This content is typically promoted on digital over traditional media as the latter 
encompasses stricter content standards (e.g., no explicit racist content, no pornography, no 
excessive violence). Consequently, White nationalist content creators regularly use digital media 
as a platform to produce and distribute information (Lewis, 2018; Marwick & Lewis, 2017). 
While social media websites have the option to remove or take down profiles, this is often not 
effectively carried out, and it does not stop the spread of content (Wong, 2018; 2019). Other 
online platforms do very little to regulate their content, even allowing hate speech (e.g., 
8chan/8kun, Montgomery, 2019).  
Altogether, this is problematic as adopting these platforms to promote their ideas allows 
the spread of pro-Whites messages that cause both the viewers and the creators of this content to 
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become more and more radicalized (Lewis, 2018). Further, media’s socializing influence is 
important in this context as information about fringe political groups (e.g., White nationalists) 
and their ideas often comes from the mass media and not from personal interactions (Shoemaker, 
1984). Because pro-White groups use social media platforms to circulate and promote their 
ideology, it is essential to understand two broad questions. First, what are the common pro-White 
themes and messages that viewers of this content are exposed to? Second, how does this 
exposure influence attitudes and behaviors relevant to pro-White ideology and outgroups 
perceived as threatening to White people?  
Overview  
Although research has begun to explore how White nationalists use and produce social 
media content (Lewis, 2018), few studies have attempted to identify the psychological themes 
discussed within this content that could motivate harmful collective action behaviors (e.g., riots, 
protests, etc.) amongst White individuals. Additionally, little research has examined how 
exposure to pro-White messaging influences related attitudes and beliefs. In this dissertation, 
guided by the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008), I systematically examine the social media content created by White nationalists 
and investigate how participants’ self-reported exposure to similar content affects White 
American audiences. 
More specifically, in Study 1 I conducted a quantitative content analysis of White 
nationalist videos on YouTube to examine: 1) how often and in what ways are outgroups 
referenced and 2) the frequency with which White identity, collective efficacy, and injustice 
towards White are discussed. These psychological constructs were specifically examined as they 
are known to influence collective action intentions in the SIMCA model. Additionally, this 
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content analysis explored the social identities of the individuals present in White nationalist 
videos on YouTube and the frequency of politically relevant content. As the far-right have an 
increasingly active political presence and influence it is important to examine how they refer to 
politics.   
Study 2 extended Study 1 by empirically testing the relation between exposure to pro-
White social media content and behaviors/attitudes related to intra and intergroup attitudes. 
Specifically, White participants’ self-reported exposure to different far-right themes and 
messaging on social media. Using a cross-sectional survey methodology, I investigated how 
exposure to this social media content can predict pro-White attitudes, emotions, and behaviors in 
the real world. Based on previous research (Forscher & Kteily, 2019), these relationships are 
tested using a sample that includes Democrats, Republicans, and those who identify as Alt-Right.  
In the following chapters, I begin by exploring in-depth the history of the White 
nationalist movement in the United States, the antecedents of pro-White attitudes, and how 
White nationalist groups use/create content on social media. I then dive into a theoretical 
examination of how this engagement with far-right digital media can lead to negative intergroup 
outcomes in the real world. I argue that motivations to participate in collective action events 
meant to uphold Whiteness is facilitated by social media. This is followed by a description, 
analysis, and discussion of Study 1 and Study 2. I end by outlining the theoretical and practical 
implications of this work as well as suggestions for future research that can address the 












Chapter 2: White Nationalism and Social Media Literature Review 
The Far Right and White Nationalism  
Although they may go by different names White nationalism and the far-right (e.g., Alt-
Right) are similar and interrelated. The Southern Poverty Law Center (2019a) describes White 
nationalists as groups who "espouse white supremacist or white separatist ideologies, often 
focusing on the alleged inferiority of nonwhites." By comparison, the Alt-Right is defined as "a 
set of far-right ideologies, groups, and individuals whose core belief is that "white identity" is 
under attack by multicultural forces using "political correctness" and "social justice" to 
undermine white people and "their" civilization" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019b). Other 
descriptions have placed the Alt-Right as a segment of the White nationalist movement (Anti-
Defamation League, n.d.). Altogether, they both place importance on and express concern for 
White identity and Whites. Because of this, research relevant to both White nationalists and the 
Alt-Right is discussed.  
While this dissertation examines the influence and relationship of social media on White 
nationalism, White supremacist ideology and groups existed long before the Internet. In the 
United States, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) can be traced as the oldest organized White supremacist 
group. Formed in the mid-1800s after the events of the American Civil War, the KKK has 
worked towards the goal of White male dominance in the U.S (Southern Poverty Law Center, 
n.d.). After a series of disbandments and revivals, the KKK reformed in the 1960s to push back 
against civil rights and policies such as desegregation. Since reforming in the 1960s, the KKK 
has kept a continued and active presence in the U.S. In the present day, the KKK has adapted to 
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using social media websites and platforms to promote its ideology and organize (Southern 
Poverty Law Center, n.d).  
While White nationalist groups like the KKK might be the oldest and most recognizable, 
the Alt-Right is steadily gaining traction in the United States. Viewed as a new school type of 
White nationalism, the Alt-Right is decentralized (e.g., lacking a top-down formal hierarchy) and 
members heavily use social media to interact with each other and spread messages (Forscher & 
Kteily. 2019). Although this group has no de facto leader, the term “Alt-Right” was coined by 
Richard Spencer in 2008 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019b), and started to gain traction 
online in 2010 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019b). Because of this and his visibility, Spencer 
is considered to be a prominent leader within the Alt-Right. While the Alt-Right has various 
objectives, its common ideology is centered on White identity and has the specific goal of 
protecting White culture in the United States (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.). 
Because of its mostly online structure and the relative recency in which the Alt-Right was 
formed, many Americans' first introduction to this group was the 2017 Unite the Right rally in 
Charlottesville (Keneally, 2018). In part, this event began because of a proposal to remove a 
confederate statue (Heim et al., 2017). Taking place on the University of Virginia campus, it 
involved a nighttime march with tiki torches, reports of racial and ethnic slurs, multiple acts of 
violence, and the death of one counter-protester. Altogether, this event resulted in a state of 
emergency being declared by the governor of Virginia (Doss, 2017). This rally was notable as it 
received widespread national and international media coverage setting in motion public and 
political discourse about the growth of pro-White ideologies and White extremism in the United 
States.   
Social and political antecedents of rising Pro-White attitudes  
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Many psychological and political explanations have been presented to understand the 
recent rise of White nationalism in the U.S. Jardina (2014) argues that the first election (e.g., 
2008) of President Barack Obama was symbolic of White people losing political power and thus 
was a turning point when Whites began to place importance on their racial and collective group 
identity. White identity importance and centrality is not only associated with hostility towards 
racial outgroups (Jardina, 2014) but also with support for and engagement with pro-White 
ideology and groups (Bai, 2020). The relationship between White identity and extremism is 
likely further moderated and strengthened by beliefs that White people are superior to other 
outgroups. Importantly, any individual who does not meet the White male demographic (e.g., the 
dominant identity to White nationalists) is an outgroup member.  
Others point to the changing demographics of the U.S., and the comparative growth of 
non-White outgroups as being an evolving threat to the status, power, and position of White 
Americans. For example, White American participants who read an article suggesting that 
Whites would become a racial minority by 2042 were more likely than those in the control 
condition to display outgroup hostility and support for conservative and ingroup protective 
policies (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; 2014b). The authors noted that perceptions of one’s ingroup 
becoming a numerical minority is likely to elicit status and power threat amongst participants 
(Craig & Richeson, 2014a; 2014b). Similarly, because a population decline is associated with 
beliefs that White Americans are facing an existential threat, it contributes to support for the far-
right and conservatism (Bai & Federico, 2020; 2021). The different circumstances discussed are 
important as both affective (e.g., sensation seeking) and cognitive (cognitive rigidity) 
dispositions identified above can influence extreme forms of political action (Zmigrod & 
Goldenberg, 2021).  
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In addition to the points discussed above, White Americans might feel disenfranchised 
because of an increased focus on DEI (Bryan, 2020) and White privilege (McIntosh, 2004) in the 
last decade. These frustrations are not inconsequential as they have led some to argue that related 
topics such as systematic racism do not have a place in public spaces. For example, the teaching 
of Critical Race Theory has been banned in schools across the U.S. (Asmelash, 2021). 
Altogether, these factors have likely contributed to White Americans' belief that they are 
becoming increasingly disenfranchised. Indeed, recent public opinion data finds that a majority 
of Republicans (55%) and a fifth of Democrats (20%) believe White people are discriminated 
against (Pew Research Center, 2019). This is supported by empirical research that finds starting 
in the year 2000 White Americans report that they face more racial discrimination as compared 
to Black people (Norton & Sommers, 2011). The belief in their disadvantaged position is partly 
explained by White American’s perceptions that they are not being given a voice and that they 
are being silenced (Takahashi & Jefferson, 2021).  
Importantly, much of the research discussed above examines political and social 
antecedents of far-right beliefs using a general sample of White Americans. Little quantitative 
research has attempted to directly sample participants who identify as pro-White or with pro-
White groups. To my knowledge, only one peer-reviewed quantitative study has directly sampled 
the Alt-Right. Indeed, Forscher and Kteily (2019) employ a sample of Alt-Right participants to 
examine the psychological makeup of this group.  
Using a nationally representative sample, Forscher and Kteily find that 6% of Americans 
and 10% of Trump voters identify as Alt-Right. Psychologically, they find that individuals who 
identify with the Alt-Right place importance on the dominance of Whites and men and are more 
concerned about discrimination toward these groups as compared to groups typically thought of 
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as disadvantaged (Forscher & Kteily, 2019). Additionally, Alt-Right participants were found to 
strongly differ from others (non-Alt-Right Trump voters and non-Trump voters) in their support 
for collective action that benefits White people. Examples of this included belief that 
organizations should look out for the interests of Whites. Although the research by Forscher and 
Kteily (2019) extends our knowledge of social and political factors that influence the far-right, it 
remains unknown how media, and specifically social media are used by these groups to spread 
their message and motivate the general public to join their movement. More specifically, a 
systematic examination of the kinds of psychological themes discussed in social media created 
by pro-White groups and the effects of exposure to this information on the White audience is 
unknown.  
Examination of media’s role is important as the influence of political (e.g., ideology) and 
psychological (e.g., racial identity) factors on White extremism is likely further magnified by the 
availability and use of social media. For example, in 2008 Facebook had 100 million users; in 
2019 this number has reached 2.26 billion (Ortiz-Ospina, 2019). This rise in use is reflected in 
the difference in the number of hours spent using digital media between 2008 (2.7 hours) and 
2018 (6.3 hours). In addition to general use, more individuals are specifically discussing politics 
and race (Pew Researcher Center, 2016a) on social media. However, public opinion data show 
that political conversations online are sometimes negative and contentious (Pew Research 
Center, 2016b). Indeed, compared to discussions of politics in other areas of life, on social 
media, they are seen as less respectful, less civil, and angrier. The content discussed on social 
media platforms is influential as information, accurate or inaccurate, spreads easily through them 
(Menczer & Hills, 2020). In the next section, I discuss in detail the ways in which White 
nationalist groups use social media to spread their message.  
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White Nationalism and Social Media  
Organizing and connecting on social media. Social media is a useful tool to organize 
groups, communities, and events without meeting in a physical capacity (Barrett, 2019). In other 
words, digital media platforms are influential in helping form online communities. For example, 
hashtags can be used to focus conversations and spread discourse (Blevins et al., 2019; Kuo, 
2018). Since hashtags can be used on any platform this may help communities form across 
different social media platforms. For example, the use of the hashtag Black Lives Matter (BLM) 
was popularized and used by individuals to communicate during the protests in Ferguson, 
Missouri. BLM, in its early stages, became synonymous with its hashtag (#BLM). Through this, 
it was able to reach a broader range of people by trending on multiple social media websites and 
giving protesters something to gather around and identify with (Sidner & Simon, 2015). 
Importantly, the use of social media platforms is quantifiably effective at generating media 
attention for social movements (Freelon, Mcllwain, & Clark, 2016; Freelon, Mcllwain, & Clark, 
2018).  
In the same way that marginalized groups like BLM use social media to organize and 
distribute information, White nationalists also use it as a tool to spread their message. Indeed, 
highly influential far-right users on Twitter are more likely to post original content as compared 
to retweeting others (Åkerlund, 2020). This allows influential members in this community to 
dictate the direction of the messaging online more completely. Additionally, digital media is 
beneficial for those that feel threatened, disenfranchised, or are experiencing extreme scrutiny 
from mainstream society, like far-right groups (Stieglitz et al., 2018). Beyond presenting, 
sharing, and controlling information easily, digital media has facilitated connection and 
belonging with individuals who share similar far-right interests and ideologies. For example, 
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when banned from mainstream platforms like Facebook, far-right individuals were able to 
recreate their connections and networks on other social media apps like Telegram (Urman & 
Katz, 2020). These connections are important as data from qualitative in-depth interviews point 
to new recruits’ engagement with experienced right-wing extremists online as helping to 
facilitate and accelerate radicalization (Gaudette, Scrivens, Venkatesh, 2020).  
How do White nationalists use social media? Altogether, two ways White nationalists 
use social media are: (1) to form a collective identity and (2) to create content directed toward 
outgroups. For instance, Proud Boys, a fast-growing far-right group, use Instagram to spread 
their message, mostly through the use of memes (DeCook, 2018). Specifically, Proud Boys use 
humor and twist pop culture images to convey messages that support their Alt-Right and often 
pro-White ideas. As an example, Alt-Right groups commonly use "Pepe the Frog" as a type of 
mascot or symbol in their content. 





Interestingly the frog emoji referencing this meme has also been found to be regularly 
used by those who support a White nationalist ideology on Twitter (Hagen et al., 2019). This 
indicates that popular far-right memes and messaging often travel across social media platforms 
(e.g., Instagram and Twitter). Indeed, the pairing of pop culture, humor, and hate speech allow 
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social media users to view racist content in a way that is more disarming than just seeing hate 
speech alone. DeCook (2018) goes on to discuss how the use of memes and social media allows 
this group to highlight White identity and create a message to draw in White supporters. 
Together, these practices allow groups like the Proud Boys to strategically use social media as a 
way to both spread their message and to recruit individuals.   
The use of social media by these groups might be particularly influential because of the 
focus on Whiteness or the supremacy of White people. For example, data show that when 
individuals see information about their racial group online, they are more likely to share that 
content when they have high racial identification (Bigman et al., 2019). In the context of future 
research, Bigman and colleagues discuss how conversations about disadvantaged Whites online 
could lead to increased racial identity and subsequently increased sharing of stories that highlight 
how White people are negatively impacted.  
White nationalist messaging on social media. Other platforms allow far-right 
communities to form around various White nationalist related topics and messaging. Examining 
hashtags on Twitter, data show that Alt-Right users regularly clustered around hashtags 
associated with Donald Trump (e.g., #maga, #trump, #draintheswamp; Xu, 2020). These 
hashtags were also found to be a connection between the Trump movement and examples of 
populism across the world (e.g., #brexit). Also related to Donald Trump, the popular but now 
banned subreddit "r/The Donald" became an online meeting place for individuals to develop a 
pro-White collective identity. An analysis of user comments found community identity was 
formed around discussing two White nationalist outgroups (e.g., Muslims, the Left) in hate-filled 
contexts (Gaudette, Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2020). 
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 In addition to Reddit, data from Facebook (Scrivens & Amarasingam, 2020) and Twitter 
(Berger, 2016) find that White nationalists on these websites also discuss Muslims as a threat to 
White people. Other groups, including immigrants/refugees (Ekman, 2018), are likewise 
considered risks to White’s dominant status. Importantly, critiques of feminism and promoting 
the manosphere are used online in expanding White nationalist ideology on social media (Bjork-
James, 2020). In addition to the more traditional platforms discussed above, negative 
conversations about outgroups are also found on non-mainstream right-wing extremist social 
media websites (Scrivens et al., 2021). Altogether, Muslims, immigrants, and feminists are 
negatively discussed by the far-right online as this allows users to highlight and place an 
emphasis on the supremacy of White males. 
Although not social media related, Forscher and Kteily (2019) asked participants about 
their trust in mainstream media (e.g., CNN, The New York Times, etc.) and alternative media 
(e.g., Fox News, Sean Hannity) institutions. This data shows that Alt-Right participants had 
significantly less trust in mainstream media and significantly more trust in alternative media 
institutions as compared to non-Alt-Right Trump voters and non-Trump voters. Although this 
research did not explore the predictive influence of media, the differences found in the context of 
mainstream and alternative media for the Alt-Right point to its potential importance. Because 
many in the Alt-Right do not trust mainstream forms of media (Forscher & Kteily, 2019), these 
individuals are especially likely to seek and be susceptible to alternative forms of media (e.g., 
social media). While far-right individuals might use a wide range of social media platforms to 
disseminate their message, one influential platform for this group, and the focus of Study 1 of 
this dissertation, is YouTube.  
YouTube and White Nationalism 
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 Undoubtedly, YouTube is one of the most popular social media websites on the Internet. 
Launched in 2005, YouTube reports that over a billion hours of content is viewed every day 
(YouTube Press, n.d.). YouTube highlights that it is defined by four essential freedoms, 
including freedom of expression, information, opportunity, and to belong. At its core, YouTube 
is a social media website where individuals can record videos and post for others to see. Once a 
video is posted, individuals can view, provide comments, like, dislike, and share with others. 
Although it has an explicit definition and policy for handling hate-related content and recently 
made headlines for banning White nationalists (Perez, 2020), there is an extensive White 
nationalist presence (Lewis, 2018). 
Why do White nationalists use YouTube? Research on far-right groups and individuals 
points to the importance of YouTube as a social media platform in making the message of White 
nationalist groups highly visible (Ekman, 2014). Heightened visibility is important as it can lead 
to cross-platform promotion and new connections with Whites who might be sympathetic to their 
message. Additionally, White nationalists use the audio/visual components of YouTube to 
influence viewer affect. By displaying visual ideas of friendship and resistance, far-right video 
creators hope to build an emotional connection to draw in individuals (Ekman, 2014). Far-right 
groups on YouTube can also use affective messaging subtitled in both English and other western 
European languages to focus individuals on the importance of a White racial community 
(Feshami, 2021). By strategically concentrating on linguistics and Whiteness these videos are set 
to unite viewers against outgroups that might imperil the White race.  
Once this content draws someone in, they can navigate the extensive and like-minded 
networks that exist on YouTube (Chen et al., 2021). This is problematic on this platform as in the 
far-right context individuals often trend from milder to more extreme content over time (Ribeiro 
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et al., 2019). Indeed, Lewis (2018) notes that far-right networks on social media allow these 
groups to do three things: (1) build an alternative media, (2) promote an ideology, and (3) 
radicalize through social networking. While the far-right is present on almost all social media 
websites, a combination of features and content available through YouTube make it an important 
platform. 
 First, YouTube is explicitly made for individuals to broadcast themselves and their ideas 
(Lewis, 2018). As compared to similar websites (e.g., Facebook, Reddit, Twitter), the almost 
sole focus of YouTube is to create vlogs or video content about a specific issue. This 
concentrates the viewer on whatever the video's topic is and reduces distractions associated with 
other social media (e.g., networking with friends and family). Second, YouTube has built-in 
financial incentives where content creators with large followings can receive a part of the 
advertising revenue concerning the content they post. This incentivizes individuals and groups to 
create videos that will generate a high number of views and recruit individuals to follow a 
specific channel. As Munger and Phillips (2020) note, the ease in which videos can be posted 
and watched, along with the presence of financial incentives has created a supply and demand 
type relationship on YouTube. Further, this contributes to the increasing creation and viewing of 
far-right content on YouTube. This is because far-right channels on YouTube are able to form 
communities that contribute to further radicalization through not only viewing the videos but 
also with the engagement of messaging present in comment sections for individual videos.  
White nationalist messaging on YouTube. Because far-right and problematic content 
on YouTube is common, it is easily accessible to people who engage with this platform. Using a 
sample that approximates being nationally representative, Chen and colleagues (2021) find that 
just under 9.2% of participants have viewed a video from an extremist channel. Additionally, 
 17 
22.1% of participants reported having watched a video from an alternative channel. Alternative 
channels are described as “YouTube channels that potentially serve as gateways to more extreme 
forms of content” (Chen et al., 2021, pg. 16). Of importance, most participants (90%) who 
viewed this far-right content are also individuals who were identified as being high in racial 
resentment, a belief that is focused on perceptions of anti-Blackness, moral traditionalism, and 
racial individualism. This suggests that extremist content may be especially appealing to 
individuals who espouse animosity towards other groups and have extremist and radicalized 
intergroup attitudes. In this context, it is especially harmful given YouTube’s recommendation 
software that can guide users to view additional content that often has a similar and biased theme 
(Chen et al., 2021).  
Examination of YouTube content reveals that far-right networks and user comments 
show widespread concern over the threats posed by refugees (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020) and 
are discriminatory toward LGBT communities (Ottoni et al., 2018). Far-right videos on YouTube 
also frequently emphasize topics such as feminism, social justice, and White genocide (Munger 
& Phillips, 2020). Additionally, YouTube videos regularly discuss war and terrorism as well as 
Muslims in a stereotyped/biased way (Ottoni et al., 2018). As stated earlier, any individual who 
does not reflect the White male dominant identity is an outgroup member. Stereotyped portrayals 
of outgroups (e.g., Muslims, immigrants, and feminists) on social media websites like YouTube 
are important, as they are used to benefit White nationalists. For example, Johns (2017) notes 
that platforms like YouTube can be used to mobilize like-minded far-right individuals to attend 
demonstrations and harass outgroups. Additionally, these outgroups are typically discussed 
negatively in far-right content as they are threatening to White males. This is because they 
believe non-White male outgroups are endangering their dominant status.  
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As referenced above, both minority racial progress (Wilkins et al., 2017) and shifting 
demographics (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; 2014b) threaten Whites' advantageous position in 
American society. Discussing the growing rise of outgroups in the context of physical, economic, 
or symbolic threats to Whites on YouTube could be an effective recruiting tool that strengthens 
and radicalizes online member’s collective identity. While much of the far-right narrative 
explicitly discusses non-White outgroups (e.g., immigrants and Muslims) as a threat to 
Whiteness (Berger, 2016; Johns, 2017; Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020), feminism is typically 
critiqued or discussed in a generally negative context (Bjork-James, 2020).  
 To summarize, because of the content, networks, and incentives, YouTube is a popular 
website for White nationalists to use. As Ekman (2014) notes, by creating videos that focus on 
collective White identity and the ability to mobilize, far-right groups use YouTube to strengthen 
individuals sympathetic to their cause. Content is important as it has the potential to both recruit 
and engage new users, as well as continue to radicalize the beliefs of those who already hold 
White nationalist attitudes. The spread of radicalization, fake news, and paranoia through digital 
media can in turn lead to violence and deadly consequences in the real world (Johnson, 2018).  
White nationalism, collective action, and digital spaces. Despite the use of social 
media regarded as an important tool in motivating several recent violent incidents perpetuated by 
White extremist (Cellan-Jones, 2021; Frenkel, 2021), few studies have examined the 
psychological factors that could explain the relation between social media use and collective 
actions in the real world. Olson (1965) argues that groups of individuals will work together to 
maximize their gains and decrease their potential losses. While various factors can influence a 
person’s ability to collectively act, Olson adds that the size of the group is important to consider. 
Indeed, smaller groups as compared to larger groups can more easily organize. Because 
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segments of the larger White nationalist movement such as the Alt-Right are largely 
decentralized and scattered, it might make it easier for them to work together and promote 
various pro-White actions, especially online. Although Olson’s (1965) propositions about 
collective action were formed before the Internet and social media, arguably online platforms are 
a unique form of action and interact with in-person examples of participation. 
Of interest, the ability to use social media to organize is important as it expands the 
opportunities for groups to engage in collective action (Bimber, 2017). For example, longitudinal 
data finds that when individuals participate in collective actions offline it spills over into 
additional online actions (Chayinska, Miranda, & Gonzalez, 2021). For Whites, offline examples 
of collective action could include signing a petition in support of a policy that benefits White 
people or participating in a protest against something that might be threatening to this group. In 
the context of social media, collective actions could include signing an online petition, liking or 
following a group that is supportive towards Whites, and providing supportive comments to pro-
White groups (Schumann & Klein, 2015).  
Online collective action might be especially useful to White nationalist groups as it is 
described as being able to scale quickly and be more flexible at bridging different issues and 
political targets (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Using social media also allows individuals to 
create programs and bots that can work toward a specific goal without the user’s active 
participation. This strategy is shown to be regularly used by far-right members on platforms like 
Reddit (Flores-Saviaga, Keegan, & Savage, 2018). Indeed, as Flores-Saviaga and colleagues 
(2018) note, on the White nationalist subreddit /r/The Donald bots were used to strengthen a 
shared identity and promote continued engagement. Additionally, digital media affords personal 
networks to play a greater role in protests and mobilization (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011). 
 20 
Altogether, the technological abilities and features on social media allow individuals to control, 
shape the environment, and disseminate information quickly to increase the success of digital 
forms of activism (Ahuja, Patel, Suh, 2018). In the next section I discuss the importance of 
examining three key psychological mechanisms known to influence collective actions within 








































Chapter 3: SIMCA and Collective Action 
The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) 
The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) is an extension of Social 
Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 
1987) and is a useful theoretical model to understand the psychological underpinnings of 
collective action 




When faced with perceptions of group-based inequalities, SIMCA suggests that 
individuals will engage in collective actions to improve the position of their ingroup. Collective 
action is described as actions "directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole" 





circumstances. Indeed, both the social/psychological determinants of the action and the 
protesters’ objective state of disadvantage can influence a demonstration (van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). These factors along with others could affect the extent of the action 
and whether it is peaceful or involves violence. Similarly, collective action is flexible and takes 
place both online and offline as referenced in Chapter Two. For example, individuals might have 
the option to participate in a single action by signing a petition either online or in person.  
Because collective actions are difficult to directly assess researchers typically rely on 
indirect measures (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). These measures are often classified 
as attitudes (e.g., I support collective action), intentions (e.g., I would be willing to participate in 
collective action), and behaviors (e.g., participants sign a petition). Importantly, although 
attitudes and behaviors are related to each, intentions are key in strengthening this relationship 
(van Zomeren et al., 2008). Van Zomeren et al (2008) suggest that “whereas attitudes can be 
relatively idealistic, intentions tend to take more account of practical limitations and 
opportunities” (p. 510). Altogether, this highlights the important role that intentions play in 
predicting whether an individual participates in an actual collective action.  
SIMCA relative to disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Much of existing research 
using SIMCA is in the context of marginalized and disadvantaged groups (Duncan, 2012). This 
work documents how unfair group disadvantages and injustices can motivate individuals to work 
together as a group to improve their group status, position, and/or image in the mainstream 
society. Extending this work in the context of media, research finds that exposure to negative 
media depictions of one’s ingroup can increase stigmatized members to engage in collective 
action efforts especially when those depictions are perceived to be inaccurate (Saleem, Hawkins, 
Wojcieszak, & Roden, 2021. Negative media depictions of one’s ingroup can also increase 
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perceptions of discrimination and subsequently raise participation in non-violent collective 
actions (Schmuck & Tribastone, 2020). Of interest, Schmuck and Tribastone (2020) exposed 
Muslim participants to stereotyped far-right social media content about their ingroup. Other 
research on SIMCA finds that alternative and social media news affect protest intentions through 
injustice, identity, and efficacy (Chan, 2017).  
Comparatively less work has examined how these processes influence the collective 
action intentions of advantaged group members, such as White Americans. However, some 
similar patterns have been observed for advantaged members (e.g., Whites) when they perceive 
that they are experiencing an injustice (Thomas, Zubielevitch, Sibley, & Osborne, 2020). Indeed, 
Thomas and colleagues (2020) find that perceived economic injustice experienced by their 
ethnicity mediated the long-term relationship between ingroup identity and willingness to 
participate in collective action to benefit their ingroup for members of advantaged (e.g., Whites) 
and disadvantaged groups. Other work focuses on what underlying reasons motivate advantaged 
members to act in solidarity with movements aimed at improving the status of marginalized 
groups (Adra, Li, & Baumert, 2020; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, Bettache, 2011). For 
instance, feelings of guilt related to group-based advantages are known to influence White 
Americans beliefs in White privilege and support for affirmative action (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 
2003).  
SIMCA and extremist/radicalized behaviors. Notwithstanding the contributions of 
these studies, there is almost no research to date applying the SIMCA theoretical framework to 
understand the collective action motivations of White extremist groups. This is surprising given 
the growing perception of collective disadvantage that Whites in America are experiencing (Pew 
Research Center, 2019). It is important to state that the accuracy or objectivity (or lack thereof) 
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of these perceptions does not undermine their potential to influence related cognitions, feelings, 
and behavioral intentions. For example, viewing race as a zero-sum game is likely associated 
with increases to White American’s belief that their culture is being threatened and decreases in 
support for affirmative action (Norton & Sommers, 2011).   
By identifying the antecedents and predictors of extremist (or radicalized) behavior, 
SIMCA can be an especially useful framework for understanding the activism of pro-White 
individuals and organizations. Indeed, existing research applying this model to extremist groups 
reveals that increased collective efficacy can significantly influence violent forms of action 
(Setiawan, Scheepers, & Sterkens, 2020). The SIMCA model also identifies that a stronger social 
identity mediates the relationship between feelings of injustice/efficacy and support for terrorism 
(Yustisia, Shadiqi, Milla, & Muluk, 2020). In other words, efficacy, social identity, and injustice 
are each associated with radicalized examples of collective action. As White nationalism is 
inherently an extremist ideology, the SIMCA framework, its proposed mechanisms, and the 
existing research can be used to theoretically evaluate the underlying motivations of how White 
nationalists engage in protest. Recent real-world examples show that this can range from online 
petitions to propaganda flyers to violent demonstrations (e.g., Charlottesville and the Capitol 
riot).  
SIMCA Mechanisms  
The SIMCA model argues that the likelihood of participating in collective action is a 
function of three psychological mechanisms, group identity, perceptions of group injustice, and 
beliefs of collective efficacy (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Individually, meta-
analyses show that each of these factors is significant and has a moderate effect in predicting 
collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). However, van Zomeren and 
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colleagues discuss that integrating all three routes into a single model provides a more complete 
and nuanced explanation of collective action. For example, social identity is found to influence 
collective efforts, both directly and indirectly, through injustice (e.g., anger) and efficacy (van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). According to the authors, this finding helps bridge 
explanations of how injustice and efficacy affect collective action.  
The SIMCA mechanisms are powerful as they mediate the relationship between digital 
participation and continued willingness to organize into the future (Odag˘, Ulug˘, & Solak, 
2016). Indeed, the authors discuss that their data point to protests being kept alive indirectly 
through digital collective actions. This research and others (Velasquez & Montgomery, 2020) 
highlights the potential usefulness of online collective action in the context of SIMCA. To 
summarize, the studies discussed throughout (Chan, 2017; Odag˘, Ulug˘, & Solak, 2016; Saleem 
et al., 2020; Schmuck & Tribastone, 2020) show that media can affect the psychological 
mechanisms identified by SIMCA to motivate collective actions. Given the Alt-Right’s extensive 
use of digital spaces (Forscher & Kteily, 2019), below I explain how references to each of the 
three proposed psychological mechanisms deriving collective action are explicitly and implicitly 
prevalent in pro-White social media content. 
Injustice.  Injustice is described as "generally aroused by perceptions of unfair treatment 
or outcomes… feelings of injustice tend to be based on subjective perceptions of group-based 
inequity (i.e., some inequality or disadvantage that is perceived as illegitimate)" (van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008, p. 512). Importantly, injustice can either be classified as objective or 
perceived. Research examining this mechanism has typically focused on the influence of 
perceived injustice as objective injustice is less effective at predicting participation in collective 
action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Perceptions of injustice can increase when an 
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individual perceives that they or their group are treated unfairly compared to another group. In 
turn SIMCA argues that perceptions of injustice motivate collective action efforts to address or 
push back against the perceived injustice (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Indeed, 
research finds that both perceptions of inequality and injustice can motivate collective action 
(Renger, Eschert, Teichgräber, & Renger, 2019).  
Application to the present research. References to unjust treatment, reverse racism, and 
marginalized and disenfranchised status of Whites is frequently discussed by White extremists. 
For instance, quotes from qualitative in-depth interviews with White nationalist groups revealed 
that many members consider “What white people need to realize is that it doesn’t matter if they 
are racist or not but the majority of blacks and Hispanics are racist against whites and they don’t 
care what your political beliefs are or whether you voted for Obama or not” (Dentice & Bugg, 
2016, pp. 118-199). Other research discusses how terms (e.g., White genocide) that indicate 
Whites are in danger because of their perceived marginalized status are present in alternative far-
right networks on social media (Munger & Phillips, 2020). Similarly, references to Whites no 
longer being the majority and racial minorities having advantages over Whites (i.e., reverse 
racism) are frequently made on platforms such as Twitter (Petray & Collin, 2017; Shafer, 2017). 
As Petray and Collin (2017) note, reverse racism can be used in a defensive way when Whites 
discuss racism online. For example, it can be used to push back against programs beneficial to 
marginalized groups like affirmative action that some Whites may view as unjust (e.g., claiming 
these programs are racist toward White people). Because individuals in most cases can post 
without moderation, digital media is an outlet where pro-White content creators can claim 
injustice toward their group and argue against ideas like White privilege.  
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However, it is still unknown the extent and frequency with which discussions of injustice 
toward Whites are present in far-right social media and how exposure to this content might 
radicalize those who view it. Indeed, social media content generated by White nationalist groups 
might not only make audiences aware of the "injustices" faced by Whites but also reference the 
need for Whites to "wake up" and collectively work together to resolve these injustices before it 
is too late. 
Social Identity. The unjust treatment of one’s ingroup is especially likely to motivate 
collective action when individuals highly identify with their ingroup (van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008). SIMCA argues that when individuals highly identify with a group and perceive 
the treatment of that group as unjust vis-a-vis other groups, then members will participate in 
collective action to alter that status differential. Though historically much work on social identity 
didn’t focus on the racial identity of Whites, current research reveals that White identity is 
indeed important to White Americans and influences their group dynamics in similar ways as 
racial minorities (Jardina, 2019). Jardina (2014; 2019) reports that 30-40% of White Americans 
see their racial identity as important to them. Increased identification with White identity is 
associated with attitudes such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Jardina, 
2014), both of which are related to collective actions aimed at improving the status and position 
of Whites in society.  
Application to the present research. The importance of forming and strengthening 
White identity is routinely discussed in White nationalist social media (DeCook, 2018). 
References to a collective identity are meant to include and radicalize the casual White consumer 
of this content (Lovett, 2019). This often occurs through Whiteness being situated as dominant 
and by focusing on the supremacy of Whites compared to other social identity outgroups. This 
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belief is a common narrative shown through quotes collected from White nationalist message 
boards including “The White Race truly is THE Master Race. That’s what Adolf Hitler preached, 
and I most sincerely believe it. We ARE at the top of the food chain, and when the day comes 
that we ALL start thinking that way again, this time the world will truly be OURS”, and “To be 
white is to be part of a small group possessing talents, conscience and beauty that cannot be 
found in any other creatures on the planet” (Dentice & Bugg, 2016, pp. 112-118). Other topics 
such as real-world intergroup conflict can influence and solidify a collective White identity in 
online groups (Biluc et al., 2019). For example, conversations in a far-right online forum 
(Stormfront) before a race-related riot in Sydney, Australia were centralized on discussions of 
group membership based on who is allied with Whites. This shifted after the riot in the real-
world to focus more on opposing non-White outgroups (Biluc et al., 2019). The change in 
messaging online situates users into an us vs. them mentality that is centered on White identity.  
Collective Efficacy. When individuals are high in collective efficacy, they believe that 
collectively as a group they can enact change to their group status. While efficacy can focus on 
the motivation of a single individual, group efficacy is the "shared belief that one's group can 
resolve its grievances through a unified effort" (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, p. 507). 
In other words, group efficacy is centered on individuals participating in action only when they 
believe that it is likely they will be successful in achieving their goals. This mechanism can be 
especially powerful as it gives individuals a sense of collective power beyond what they as an 
individual are able to accomplish (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Because a combined sense of 
efficacy is often stronger than individual efficacy this mechanism is most effective in motivating 
action in groups that place importance on their shared identity. Applied to Whites, high group-
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based collective efficacy would mean that White people have confidence in their ability as a 
group to overcome any challenges.  
Application to the present research. As mentioned above, White nationalists frequently 
discuss issues that threaten their racial ingroup. While there are likely different ways for White 
nationalists on social media to address group-based threats, one possible reaction is to consider 
how they can work together to overcome their perceived disadvantages (e.g., collective efficacy). 
For racial and ethnic minorities, political expression on social media sites is associated with 
increased collective efficacy beliefs to improve the status and position of minorities in America 
(Velasquez, Montgomery, & Hall, 2019). Yet no quantitative research has examined this 
relationship for White people. However, the following quote from an in-depth interview shows 
that some Whites place importance on working together, “When you take a small white 
community and everybody pulls together when times are tough, then that is a superior culture” 
(Dentice & Bugg, 2016, pg. 119). Theoretically, if far-right content suggests that Whites work 
together or mentions ways/strategies in which Whites can organize, this could increase viewers' 
beliefs in group-based collective efficacy. As SIMCA proposes, high group-based efficacy 
beliefs are likely to increase collective actions. In sum, each of three psychological mechanisms 
(injustice, efficacy, and identity) known to motivate collective actions are prevalent in the 
messaging created and disseminated by White nationalists. Despite the rich details learned from 
qualitative and big data studies examining White nationalist groups, several questions remain 
unanswered. 
Hypotheses, and Research Questions 
First, little quantitative research has used content analytic methods to examine the 
underlying themes and messaging within White nationalist social media. Qualitative (Bjork-
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James, 2020; DeCook, 2018) and big data research (Chen et al., 2021; Gaudette et al., 2020) has 
identified that specific topics (e.g., immigration, social and political identity, discourse about 
other races) are present in far-right content online. However, a quantitative analysis is needed to 
extend this work to determine the frequency with which these themes (relative to others) are 
discussed and their co-occurrences within White nationalist social media. Considering this and 
the previous chapters, I propose the following hypotheses and research questions to be explored 
in Study 1.  
RQ1: How frequently are Muslims, immigrants, and feminists discussed in White 
nationalist videos on YouTube? 
RQ2a: When Muslims and immigrants are mentioned, how frequently and in what 
context are they discussed as a threat in White nationalist videos on YouTube? 
RQ2b: When feminists are mentioned, how frequently are they discussed with a negative 
valence in White nationalist videos on YouTube? 
RQ3: How frequently is politically relevant content discussed in White nationalist videos 
on YouTube? 
Second, given the highly visible examples of recent far-right protests/riots (e.g., the 
Capitol riot and the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville) there is a need to further 
understand what motivates this group to engage in collective action. As discussed above, the 
SIMCA model might be especially useful as it is applicable to both extremist groups (Yustisia, 
Shadiqi, Milla, & Muluk, 2020) and social media (Chan, 2017). This is important given the 
strong White nationalist presence on digital media and this groups use of these online platforms 
to coordinate actions in the real world (Cellan-Jones, 2021). Considering this and the previous 
chapters, I propose the following hypotheses and research questions to be explored in Study 1.  
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RQ4: What is the frequency in which references to injustices faced by Whites, White 
identity, and White collective efficacy are made in White nationalist videos on YouTube?  
H1a: Discussions of injustices faced by Whites will be more frequent than discussions of 
injustices faced by other social groups in White nationalist videos on YouTube. 
H1b: Discussions of injustices faced by Whites will be more frequent than discussions of 
injustices faced by the content creators themselves in White nationalist videos on YouTube.  
H1c: Discussions of injustices faced by the content creators themselves will be more 
frequent than discussions of injustices faced by other social groups in White nationalist videos on 
YouTube. 
H2: Mentions of White people being under threat will be more frequent than mentions of 
other social groups as being under threat in White nationalist videos on YouTube.  
H3: References to injustices faced by Whites, White identity, and White collective 
efficacy are more likely to be present in videos that call for collective actions than videos that do 
not call for collective action in White nationalist videos on YouTube. 
Implications of Study 1 
Study 1 makes important contributions to our understanding of White nationalist social 
media. First, I provide a quantitative assessment of how White nationalists discuss outgroups and 
their impact on Whites’ group status and power. Second, using the theoretical propositions of 
SIMCA (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), I examine if and how frequently 
psychological mechanisms known to influence collective actions are referenced within these 
videos. Third, I document the frequency and context in which calls to collective action are made 
within these videos to improve the status and position of Whites in the U.S. Insights from this 
research establish the ways in which social media created by White nationalists use references to 
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social outgroups, White identity, efficacy, and group injustice to motivate collective actions 

























Chapter 4: Study 1 Method 
Sample Criteria and Selection 
As the goal for Study 1 is to understand the content White nationalists create on 
YouTube, the sample was drawn from research that has identified these groups (Lewis, 2018). 
This selection method is different from some previous research that has used search terms to 
collect YouTube videos (Dale et al., 2017). I made this decision for the following reason. The 
research questions and hypotheses for this study focus on: 1) how outgroups are portrayed, 2) 
how political parties and figures are referenced, and 3) whether collective action and predictors 
known to influence collective action are present in the content explicitly created by White 
nationalists. Consequently, the corpus required only videos that were produced by White 
nationalists. Thus, using a methodology that involves selecting videos based on search terms 
does not necessarily fit the scope of this study. A preliminary evaluation found that when 
searching terms associated with White nationalism on YouTube (e.g., White nationalism, White 
identity, White heritage, White discrimination, reverse racism, Whites under threat; Anti-
Defamation League, n.d.), most videos were of news stories or interviews about White 
nationalist figures or events. While these videos are informative and future research should 
examine their content, they are not relevant to the current study because White nationalists did 
not create this content.  
           Subsequently, five White nationalist groups or influencers were chosen and analyzed. 
These individuals and groups were chosen based on existing research which using social network 
analysis identified various White nationalist channels on YouTube (Lewis, 2018). The chosen 
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channels were all found to have a prominent and official (e.g., designated YouTube channel) 
presence on YouTube. Once the five channels were selected, twenty videos from each channel 
were randomly chosen using the equal probability of selection method. This technique allows 
each video on a given channel an equal chance of being selected, thus strengthening the notion 
that the included videos are representative of the channel (Dixon & Williams, 2015). This 
method yielded 100 total YouTube videos included in the corpus. Final analyses were conducted 
on a total of 99 videos as one video selected in the random draw was a "test" video and did not 
contain any content that could be coded. Additionally, as some videos were two hours and 
longer, only the first 30 minutes of each video was examined. The videos were selected and 
coded for initial descriptive information during the week of 12/23/19. The final corpus consisted 
of 30.85 hours of video. Importantly, this amount of data is similar to other content analyses 
conducted on YouTube (Dale et al., 2017; Krajewski, Schumacher, & Dalrymple, 2019).  
Of the content coded, the mean length of the video in minutes was M = 18.70 (SD = 
10.22). On average, these YouTube channels had 250,000 subscribers and 831 videos. Out of the 
five channels, four of the creators are male, and one is female. Lastly, the videos selected had on 
average M = 49,802 views (SD = 65,546), M = 927 comments (SD = 1,583), M = 2,946 likes (SD 
= 3,211) and M = 101 dislikes (SD = 186). This excludes all video engagement information from 
the channel altright.com (e.g., Richard Spencer) and two videos from American Renaissance, as 
YouTube had suspended these videos for content moderation reasons at the time of analysis.
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White nationalist figure YouTube Channel Number of videos Number of subscribers 
Rebecca Hargraves Blonde in the Belly of the 
Beast 
125 130k 
Stefan Molyneux Stefan Molyneux 3241 924k 
Colin Robertson Millennial Woes 416 54k 
Richard Spencer Altright.com 153 24k 
Jared Taylor American Renaissance 222 118k 
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Training and Reliability  
           Three trained individuals worked as coders on this study: one White male and two White 
females. Training occurred over roughly three months and consisted of approximately 25 hours. 
Tasks completed during the training included discussion of the codebook and coding scheme as 
well as practice coding. For example, regular weekly meetings were held where each variable 
coded was examined among coders and discussed until an adequate level of understanding was 
reached for each individual. Next, to create a training experience that would mirror the actual 
coding process, each individual participated in practice coding. This involved selecting White 
nationalist videos that were not chosen for this study’s corpus to practice coding. Individuals 
watched the practice videos, followed the coding steps and process, and then met after to discuss 
any confusion or irregularities in the variables examined. 
  Once training was completed, 10% of the total sample (e.g., ten videos) was randomly 
selected and assigned to all coders for reliability purposes. Conducting reliability analyses on 
10% of the total sample is considered best practice for content analytic research (Dixon & 
Williams, 2015; Neuendorf, 2017). These videos were included in the final corpus and the 
following analyses. To evaluate the reliability of coding, Krippendorf's alpha was computed 
using the ReCal software program (Freelon, 2013). Krippendorf's alpha reliability coefficients 
ranged from .54 to 1.00. When Krippendorf's alpha was unable to be calculated, percent 
agreement between coders was used. Specific variables examined in this study are detailed 
below (see Appendix A and B for a full description of each variable).   
Variables Coded 
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           Level of analysis - video. Only videos that were determined to be from White nationalist 
groups/figures were included in the corpus. All variables below were coded as "Yes" or "No" 
unless specified otherwise.   
Outgroup social identity codes.  
Feminism and feminists. Videos were coded for mentions of feminism and feminists. 
Feminism is defined as a range of social movements, political movements, and ideologies that 
aim to define, establish, and achieve the political, economic, personal, and social equality of the 
sexes. Reliability was found to be within an acceptable range  = .87. 
Feminism valence. If feminism or feminists were mentioned as defined in the code 
above, coders then established whether it was generally discussed in a positive, negative, or 
neutral way,  = .90. Positive representations could include content creators discussing the ways 
feminists are beneficial to gender relations. An example of a negative representation would be 
discussions of the ways in which feminists harm cultural values. A neutral representation is 
neither negative nor positive, such as stating an individual is a feminist without elaborating 
further.  
           Immigrants and immigration. Videos were coded for whether the individuals mention or 
discuss immigrants or immigration within a U.S. context. Immigration was defined as "the 
international movement of people to a destination country of which they are not natives or where 
they do not possess citizenship in order to settle or reside there, especially as permanent residents 
or naturalized citizens, or to take up employment as a migrant worker or temporarily as a foreign 
worker" (Refugee Council, n.d.). This included mentions of specific immigrant groups, people 
trying to immigrate to the United States, or imagery of immigrants. This variable was found to 
reach acceptable levels of reliability  = .84. 
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  Immigrant groups. If immigrants or immigration were mentioned as defined by the code 
above, it was evaluated whether a specific immigrant group was discussed. If a specific 
immigrant group was explicitly described, it was then listed.  
Immigrants as a threat. If immigrants or immigration were mentioned as defined in the 
code above, coders evaluated whether the video talked about them as a threat. Based on 
integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), examples of threats immigrants could pose 
included national security threats, public safety threats, political threats, economic threats, 
cultural and identity threats. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of reliability  = 
1.00 
 Islam and Muslims. Given the prevalence of Islamophobic content and explicit concerns 
of Muslim-perpetrated violence and terrorism in White nationalist social media groups (Gaudette 
et al., 2020), I focused on documenting references to Islam as opposed to other religious groups. 
Specifically, videos were coded for whether content related to Islam or Muslims was present. 
This was defined as "A follower of the religion of Islam, a Muslim is one who believes in God 
and that Muhammad was the supreme messenger of God" (Arab-American anti-discrimination 
committee, n.d.). Examples might include talking about Muslims from Middle Eastern countries 
and Muslims in the United States or Europe. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels 
of agreement (100% agreement between coders).  
Muslims as a threat. If Muslims or Islam were mentioned as defined by the code above, 
it was then examined for whether they were discussed as a threat. Similar to the immigration 
threat code, examples of threats Muslims could pose included national security threats, public 
safety threats, political threats, economic threats, cultural and identity threats.  
 SIMCA-derived codes. 
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           Injustice toward Whites. Videos were coded for whether individuals discuss or talk about 
injustice toward Whites or Whites being treated unfairly. Injustice tends to be based on 
subjective perceptions of group-based inequity (inequality or disadvantage perceived as 
illegitimate; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Examples include content concerning 
Whites' beliefs about being treated unfairly by an outgroup and that Whites are being put at a 
disadvantage. Reliability for this variable was found to reach acceptable levels  = .74.     
           Injustice toward minorities. Following a similar code to injustice toward Whites, I also 
coded for if videos discussed minorities being treated unjustly. This was defined as whether 
videos mentioned minorities are suffering injustice or being treated unfairly based on the 
description of injustice above. For this study, I focused on non-White racial/ethnic groups and 
non-Christian religions. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of agreement (100% 
agreement between coders).  
 Injustice toward themselves. Based on the definitions of injustice as described in the 
above code, videos were examined for whether the content creators mentioned that they 
themselves are experiencing some form of injustice or being treated unfairly,  = .86.     
           Collective efficacy. Videos were coded for whether individuals discuss or talk about 
efficacy or Whites having efficacy. Conceptually, efficacy refers to a sense of control, influence, 
strength, and effectiveness to change a group-related problem (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008). Examples of this include conversations that Whites working together can change injustice 
or discrimination, or bias towards their group. Acceptable levels of agreement were found 
between coders (87%).  
           White identity. Videos were coded for whether White identity is discussed. Identity is 
defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of 
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his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Concerning White identity, 
examples include the idea that Whites have a specific membership or some type of affiliation 
with each other or mentioning that White identity is under attack. This variable was found to 
reach acceptable levels of reliability  = .77. 
 Collective action. Videos were coded for whether individuals mention discuss or give 
examples of Whites taking collective action. This included individuals in the video discussing 
attitudinal support for protests as well as protest intentions or behaviors of Whites directed at 
removing the perceived causes of the group’s disadvantage (Wright et al., 1990). For example, 
signing a petition, participating in a protest/demonstration, or donating money to pro-White 
groups. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of reliability  = .86.  
 Whites under threat. Videos were coded for whether the content creators mention in any 
way that either White individuals or that Whites people as a group are under threat. Examples of 
threats can include abstract threats such as immigration affecting the U.S. economy or more 
direct threats like immigration will lead to increased crime in the White viewers cities and 
neighborhoods. This could also include explicit statements like “Whites are being threatened” 
without further elaboration,  = .54. Acceptable levels of agreement were found between coders 
(87%). 
 Minorities under threat. Based on the description of threat in the code above, videos 
were coded for whether they discussed threat in the context of minorities. For this study, I 
focused on non-White racial/ethnic groups and non-Christian religions. This variable was found 
to reach acceptable levels of agreement (100% agreement between coders).  
Video information codes.  
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Total number of people. For each video, the total number of individuals was recorded. 
This was considered people that have some type of speaking role or who are being interviewed 
as part of the video,  = 1.00.  
Video style (interview, personal vlog, public). Videos were coded for whether an 
interview took place. It was considered an interview if it involved more than one person in the 
video and followed an active and structured conversation between the individuals (Merriam-
Webster, n.d.). Videos were coded for whether a personal vlog was used. This is described as a 
video in which only one individual is present. It also often includes the individual speaking into a 
camera about a specific topic or things that occur in their lives. Videos were also coded for 
whether they took place in a public rather than a private setting. A public video could involve the 
recording taking place out in public such as a rally, an event, or a conference. These variables 
reached acceptable levels of agreement,  =1.00.   
 Use of infographics, graphs, or charts. Videos were coded for whether they included 
some type of visual demonstration of information. This can include infographics which are one 
way to visually represent data, or the use of graphs or charts,  = .83.  
 Outside news media coverage. Videos were coded for whether they included some form 
of news media coverage that did not originate from within the YouTube video. This is described 
as clips or embedded clips that show the presence of news reports, news stories, or news related 
to other YouTube videos. Additionally, this could include still shots from newspapers or 
television news,  = .86.  
 YouTuber social identity codes- gender. Gender presentation is described as “external 
appearance, dress, mannerism, and behavior through which each individual presents their gender 
identity or the gender they want to appear as. Gender presentation may change, for example, a 
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Drag King may present as a male during his performance, but as a female in her daily life.” 
(Positive space network, n.d.).  
 Male in video. Videos were coded for whether there was a male individual present in the 
video,  = 1.00. 
 Female in video. Videos were coded for whether there was a female individual present in 
the video,  = 1.00. 
 Trans male in video. Videos were coded for whether there was a trans male present in 
the video. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of agreement (100% agreement 
between coders). 
 Trans female in video. Videos were coded for whether there was a trans female present 
in the video. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of agreement (100% agreement 
between coders). 
YouTuber social identity codes- race. Racial categories are socially constructed, that is, 
race is not intrinsic to human beings but rather an identity created, often by socially dominant 
groups, to establish meaning in a social context. Different cultures define different racial groups, 
often focused on the largest groups of social relevance, and these definitions can change over 
time.  
White individual in video. Videos were coded for whether a White individual was 
present in the video. In this context, White is described as a person having origins in any of the 
original peoples typically of Europe. It includes people who would indicate their race(s) as 
"White" or report entries such as German, Italian, British or Caucasian (U.S. Census, n.d.). 
Additionally, it can be thought of as someone who is perceived to be White based on his or her 
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skin color. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of agreement (100% agreement 
between coders). 
Non-White individual in video. Videos were coded for whether a non-White individual 
was present in the video. This would include individuals who do not meet the criteria of “White” 
as described above. Examples could consist of people who would be perceived as Black, Asian, 
Arab, etc. This variable was found to reach acceptable levels of agreement (100% agreement 
between coders). 
Political codes. A political movement is a social group that operates together to obtain a 
political goal, on a local, regional, national, or international scope. Political movements develop, 
coordinate, promulgate, revise, amend, interpret, and produce materials that are intended to 
address the goals of the base of the movement. 
Republican party. Videos were coded for whether individuals in the video specifically 
mention the Republican party. This could also include discussing the GOP, conservatives, or the 
right,  = .86. 
Democratic party. Videos were coded for whether individuals specifically mention the 
Democratic party. This could include discussing liberals or the left,  = 1.00. 
Donald Trump. Videos were coded for if they discuss Donald Trump in any way or show 
any images or videos of him. This could also include mentioning political slogans that are 
specifically associated with Donald Trump (e.g., make America great again),  = 1.00. 
Barack Obama. Videos were coded for if they discuss Barack Obama in any way or 
show any images or videos of him. This could also include mentioning political slogans that are 
explicitly associated with Barack Obama (e.g., change we can believe in),  = 1.00.  
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Hillary Clinton. Videos were coded for if they discuss Hillary Clinton in any way or 
show images or videos of her. This could also include mentioning political slogans that are 

























Chapter 5: Study 1 Results 
Given the dichotomous nature of most variables analyzed, Chi-square analyses were 
performed when appropriate to test the proposed hypotheses and research questions.  
Outgroup Social Identity Variables  
 RQ1 asked how often different outgroups (e.g., Muslims, immigrants, feminists) would 
be mentioned in the videos analyzed. The data show that immigrants were discussed in 26:99 of 
total videos (26%), Muslims were mentioned in 27:99 of videos (27%), and feminists were 
mentioned in 28:99 of videos (28%). This resulted in 60:99 of the total videos (61%) discussing 
at least one outgroup. Next, I investigated whether any of these outgroups were present more 
than the others. Results revealed that no identity group was featured more than others. 













































Note. % is the percent of the total number of mentions for that variable. 
 
 Additionally, I was also interested in the context in which these outgroups would be 
discussed (RQ2a and RQ2b). The data show that immigrants were mentioned as a threat in 14:26 
of videos (54%), Muslims were mentioned as a threat in 17:27 of videos (63%), and feminists 
were mentioned in a negative valence in 23:28 (82%) of videos. Next, I examined whether 
differences existed in how they were discussed. No significant difference was found between 
immigrants and Muslims, χ2 (1, N = 53) = .453, p = .501 or between Muslims and feminists, χ2 
(1, N = 55) = 2.55, p = .110. However, I did find a significant difference between immigrants and 










Variable Mentions Total videos  
Immigrants 26 99 (26%) 
Muslims 27 99 (27%) 
Feminists 28 99 (28%) 
Social outgroups 
combined 















In the context of the threats that immigrants and Muslims might pose, I examined 
whether the videos mentioned if they would be considered specific threats to national security, 
public safety, politics, economics, or cultural identity (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). With both 
groups, videos included content that discussed multiple threats. For immigrants, I found that 14 
videos mentioned specific threats that this group poses. The most frequently discussed threat was 
to public safety in 8:14 of videos (57%). This was followed by threats to culture and identity in 
6:14 of videos (43%) and economic threats which were present in 2:14 of videos (14%). Political 
threats and national security threats were each found to both be mentioned in 1:14 of videos (7% 
each). Overall, 18 references to threats were made with respect to immigrants across the 14 
videos.  
For Muslims, I found that 17 videos referenced threats to this group. Both public safety 
and cultural identity threats were each found to be discussed most often in 9:18 of videos (50% 


























Negative mentions Non-negative mentions
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of videos (6% each). No videos featured discussion of Muslims posing a national security threat. 
Altogether, 20 threat references were made with respect to Muslims across the 17 videos.  
 Lastly, when immigrant groups were mentioned, I coded for which specific groups were 
discussed. Twelve videos explicitly mentioned an immigrant group. Within these videos, some 
included content that discussed multiple groups. Overall, immigrants from “Mexico and Latin 
America” were the group that was most frequently mentioned in 6:12 of videos (50%). This was 
followed by “refugees, third-world immigrants, and illegal immigrants” which were discussed in 
4:12 of videos (33%). Next, both “Muslim” and “Asian” immigrants were discussed in 3:12 of 
videos (25% each). Finally, both “European” and “Black or African” immigrants were 
mentioned in 2:12 of videos (17% each). Altogether, 20 immigrant groups were mentioned 
throughout the 12 videos.  
SIMCA Predictors  
 In addition to investigating how outgroups are portrayed in White nationalist social 
media, I was interested in the prevalence of psychological constructs known to influence 
collective action. To answer RQ4, I found that White identity was mentioned in 32:99 of videos 













Altogether, this equaled 57:99 of total videos (58%), featuring at least one SIMCA 
predictor. Next, I examined whether differences exist in how often the SIMCA predictors were 
mentioned in the corpus. Although not significant, injustice toward Whites was discussed more 
than White identity, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 3.59, p = .058. White identity, however, was significantly 
discussed more than collective efficacy, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 14.63, p < .001. I also found that 
injustice toward Whites was mentioned significantly more than collective efficacy, χ2 (1, N = 
198) = 30.84, p < .001. 










































Variable Mentions Total videos  
White identity 32 99 (32%) 
Injustice 45 99 (45%) 
Collective efficacy 10 99 (10%) 











To further examine the context in which injustice is discussed, H1a and H1b proposed 
that injustice toward Whites would be more prevalent than both discussions of injustice toward 
other social groups and toward themselves. Additionally, I proposed (H1c) that injustice toward 
themselves would be mentioned more frequently than injustice toward other social groups. 
Indeed, I found a significant difference in that injustice toward Whites (45:99, 45%) was 
mentioned more often than injustice toward other social groups (2:99, 2%), χ2 (1, N = 198) = 
51.59, p < .001, thus finding support for H1a. Similarly, I also found injustice toward Whites as a 
group was significantly more prevalent than discussing injustice toward themselves (23:99, 
23%), χ2 (1, N = 198) = 10.84, p = .001, providing support for H1b. Lastly, my data show that 
these videos were more likely to feature discussions of injustice toward themselves as compared 
to injustice toward other social groups, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 20.19, p < .001, supporting H1c.  
Next, I examined how frequently these videos included content that focused on whether 
Whites and minority groups are under threat. I found that 31:99 (31%) of the videos mentioned 
that Whites are under threat. Of importance, videos that mentioned minority groups being under 
threat were much less prevalent (2:99 of videos, 2%). To address H2 this data show that this 
content was significantly more likely to feature Whites being under threat as compared to 
minorities being under threat, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 30.58, p < .001, thus finding support for H2.  
 As the SIMCA model proposes that injustice, efficacy, and identity are all predictive of 
and related to collective action, H3 examined if videos that featured collective action were also 
more likely to include the SIMCA mechanisms. Overall, I found that content focusing on Whites 
taking collective action was discussed in 12:99 of videos (12%). To address H3, I then examined 
if at least one SIMCA predictor was more likely to be present in videos that featured collective 
action compared to videos that did not. My data show that SIMCA predictors were significantly 
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more likely to be included in videos when collective action was mentioned 12:12 of videos 
(100%) as compared to when collective action was not mentioned 45:87 (52%), χ2 (1, N = 99) = 
10.06, p = .002, thus providing support for H3. 
Video Information Variables 
 To evaluate the corpus of White nationalist social media I examined the average number 
of people in the YouTube videos. I found that on average, just over one person was present in 
this content (M = 1.42, SD = .86). Next, I investigated the style in which the video was recorded 
(e.g., interview, vlog, public place). This data shows that vlog was overwhelmingly the type of 
recording style that was most frequent in 70:99 (71%) of videos, followed by an interview in 
15:99 (15%) of videos, and a public place in 5:99 (5%) of videos. Similar to a podcast, 9 videos 
(9%) included only audio and did not feature any visuals. Next, I examined how frequently this 
content included the use of infographics, charts, and graphs. Overall, I found that the videos in 
the corpus were unlikely to include these types of visuals with only 6:99 (6%) of videos 
including infographics, charts, or graphs. Lastly, I examined the prevalence of outside news 
coverage in the videos analyzed. This data shows that outside news coverage was present in 
29:99 of videos (29%).  
YouTube Content Creator Social Identity Variables  
 Next, I examined the social identity information (e.g., gender and race) of individuals 
present in the corpus of videos. In the context of gender, I found that 80:99 (81%) of videos 
included a male individual. Whereas 25:99 of videos (25%) featured a female individual. 
Additionally, while no videos were found to include any trans male individuals, one video (1:99, 
1%) was found to include a trans female individual. In the context of race, I found that all videos 
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included a White person (99:99, 100%). Lastly, 3:99 (3%) of videos were found to include a 
non-White individual.  
Political codes 
 RQ3 asked how often political parties (e.g., Republicans and Democrats) would be 
discussed within White nationalist YouTube videos. Overall, I found that the Republican party 
was mentioned in 39:99 (39%) of videos and that the Democratic party was present in 56:99 
(57%) of videos. Additionally, I was interested in the possibility of one of these political parties 
being referenced more than the other. Indeed, the data show that videos were more likely to 
include mentions of the Democratic party as compared to the Republican party, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 
5.85, p = .016.  
Other than political parties, these videos were also found to frequently include content 
that focuses on politicians. Donald Trump was the political figure that was most prevalent in the 
videos analyzed (35:99 of videos, 35%). This was followed by two Democratic politicians, 
Barack Obama who was discussed in 15:99 of videos (15%), and Hillary Clinton in 13:99 of 
videos (13%). Further, I examined whether any of these three politicians were more likely to be 
mentioned as compared to the others. The data show that Donald Trump was more likely to be 
discussed as compared to both Barack Obama, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 10.70, p = .001, and Hillary 
Clinton, χ2 (1, N = 198) = 13.31, p < .001. There was no significant difference found between 















Chapter 6: Study 1 Discussion 
Across the U.S. the existence and influence of the far-right is growing (Anti-Defamation 
League, 2021; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2020). By providing a space to recruit and 
facilitate online networks, social media is helping to fuel this growth (Ekman 2014; Lewis, 2018; 
Marwick & Lewis, 2017). Because White nationalist groups and figures have a strong presence 
on almost all social media platforms (DeCook, 2018; Gaudette et al., 2020; Munger & Phillips, 
2020), they now have unparalleled reach to audiences worldwide. Altogether, what is occurring 
in these digital spaces has important and significant implications for what happens offline and in 
physical spaces. For example, given the role of social media messaging in inciting recent 
extremist behaviors such as the Capitol riot (Barrett, Raju, & Nickeas, 2021; Cellan-Jones, 2021; 
Frenkel, 2021), an examination of the topics within White nationalist media and their influence 
on viewers is needed. 
 Accordingly, this dissertation study examined the content that White nationalist groups 
produce themselves on social media. In this analysis, I examine the social identities of the 
individuals present in the YouTube videos and provide video production information. 
Additionally, I apply the SIMCA model (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) to these White 
nationalist videos to explore the prevalence of mechanisms known to motivate collective action. 
Lastly, I investigate how frequently White nationalist figures discuss groups including Muslims, 
feminists, and immigrants, as well as how they discuss these specific social identity outgroups 
when they are present in the content.  
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SIMCA Derived Data 
Study 1 results revealed that each of the SIMCA predictors (e.g., group identity, injustice, 
collective efficacy) are regularly present in the corpus of far-right YouTube videos. Indeed, more 
than half of the videos (e.g., 58%) featured at least one of the SIMCA predictors. When 
examining the prevalence of each mechanism, the data did not show any significant differences 
between the occurrences of White identity and injustice toward Whites. However, both of these 
predictors were found to occur more frequently when compared to collective efficacy.  
Examining the differences in the frequency in which SIMCA theorized psychological 
mechanisms are present in White nationalist social media content reveals interesting trends. 
References to injustices faced by Whites was the most frequently referenced SIMCA 
mechanism. This coincides with existing offline data revealing that White individuals perceive a 
rise in discrimination against their ingroup and perceptions of reverse racism in society (Norton 
& Sommers, 2011). Further, references to the idea of White privilege are known to frustrate 
many White individuals who do not perceive their individual life experiences to be privileged in 
any way (Edwards, 2017). Indeed, just under one-fourth of videos (e.g., 23%) featured 
discussions of injustice that they personally are perceiving to experience. These perceptions are 
consistent with the idea of thinking about racial progress as a zero-sum game, another perception 
that has sharply risen in the last decade (Norton & Sommers, 2011).  
To show that far-right social media does not discuss injustice generally, I compared the 
occurrence of videos that mentioned injustice toward Whites to injustice toward other social 
groups and the content creators themselves. Overwhelmingly, I found that injustice toward 
Whites (e.g., 45%) was referenced more frequently than injustice toward other social groups 
(e.g., 2%), and injustice toward themselves (e.g., 23%). I also found that speakers discussed 
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injustice toward themselves more often than injustice toward other social groups. Altogether, this 
demonstrates that when White nationalists discuss injustice, they do so in a way that is beneficial 
to White people. Conceptually related to feelings of injustice, a similar pattern was found when 
examining references to threats faced by Whites. Specifically, the analyzed videos were 
significantly more likely to feature content that mentioned the ways in which White individuals 
are under threat (e.g., 31%) compared to the ways in which minorities are under threat (e.g., 2%). 
Altogether, these results have important implications for how White Americans who view this 
content are likely to perceive the treatment of both White majority and non-White minority 
groups in the United States.  
White identity was the SIMCA theorized mechanism found to be mentioned the second 
most (e.g., 32% of videos). While little quantitative research has examined the connection 
between the far-right, White identity, and social media, this is an area that qualitative research 
has explored in-depth (DeCook (2018). Regular mentions of Whiteness online are significant as 
digital media can be used to construct a collective White identity. The current data provide 
quantitative support for the frequency and presence of White identity on social media and the 
trends observed in qualitative research for this topic (DeCook, 2018). While establishing the 
prevalence of White identity on social media is important, this study did not provide data on how 
and when White identity is mentioned and whether it was in a negative or positive context. 
Future work can address these limitations.  
Conceptually, positive vs. negative discussions of White identity could have significant 
and differing implications. For example, frequent exposure to positive mentions of White 
identity on social media could increase attitudes and emotions related to “White pride”. On the 
other hand, viewing content that focuses on negative aspects of White identity could serve as a 
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social identity threat for White viewers. Such identity threats are known to induce a variety of 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral coping strategies (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; 2014b; Wilkins 
et al., 2017), including collective action efforts. Indeed, similar research has found that exposure 
to negative representations of their group in the news motivates Muslim Americans to engage in 
collective actions to improve the position and status of their ingroup in the mainstream society 
(Saleem et al., 2021). Thus, more research is needed to examine the context in which White 
identity is discussed within far-right social media.  
Lastly, although collective efficacy was the predictor found to occur least often, there are 
likely a few reasons for this. Mainly, efficacy is more difficult to encode into media as it is an 
abstract perception. For example, regardless of an individual’s identity, injustice and racial 
identity are both concepts that are likely more common and applicable in one's everyday life. 
Because of this, creating social media content that focuses on efficacy is conceptually more 
difficult. Although this mechanism was not found to be frequently discussed within White 
nationalist videos this does not mean it is not important.  
For example, it is possible that watching White nationalist videos motivate efficacious 
beliefs, as opposed to it being explicitly referenced in the content. If exposure to White 
nationalist social media increases feelings of White collective efficacy, then SIMCA argues it 
would be influential at affecting collective action intentions. With this mechanism, the overall 
messaging of the content as a whole rather than specific mentions or examples of efficacy should 
be considered. Given the present study's findings, continued research should look at how the idea 
of efficacy is discussed within the social media content created by White nationalists.  
Social Identity Outgroup Data 
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Previous research has identified Muslims (Gaudette et al., 2020), immigrants (Ekman, 
2018), and feminists (Munger & Phillips, 2020) as outgroups that underly many of the 
grievances of White extremist ideology (Squire, 2019). However, little quantitative content 
analytic research has examined 1) the frequency in which these groups are discussed and 2) the 
context (e.g., threats, etc.) of how these social outgroups are referenced in social media content 
created by White nationalists. Negative references to these three outgroups are especially likely 
given that past work suggests these outgroups are perceived as most threatening to White 
American males’ dominant status in the U.S (Berger, 2016; Bjork-James, 2020; Johns, 2017; 
Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020). 
 Overall, I find that each of these three groups was mentioned in just over one-fourth of 
the videos. This resulted in at least one social identity outgroup being discussed in 61% of the 
videos analyzed. Arguably, this establishes that White nationalist YouTube videos frequently 
and regularly feature one of these outgroups. Additionally, the data show that when all three 
groups are discussed, it is typically in a negative way (feminists) or as a threat (Muslims and 
immigrants). Closer examination of differences in how these groups are portrayed suggested that 
there is no significant difference between Muslims and immigrants in the context of threat. This 
suggests that White nationalist groups consider Muslims and immigrants to pose similar levels of 
overall threat to White Americans. In addition to coding the context of how these groups were 
portrayed, I also investigated the specific types of threats that were discussed concerning 
Muslims and immigrants.  
Using categories identified by Stephan and Stephan (2000), I found that the two types of 
threats most commonly attributed to both Muslims and immigrants were threats to public safety 
and cultural identity. Indeed, these specific types of threats have theoretical implications. White 
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nationalist social media highlighting that both Muslims and immigrants are endangering safety 
fits with their overall narrative that these groups are the most dangerous to White Americans. By 
focusing on an individual’s safety, it is likely to make White people who view this content 
question if both themselves and their families are safe from these outgroups.  Research suggests 
that perceptions of Muslims as aggressive and violent can increase support for harmful public 
policies targeting members of this group (Saleem et al., 2017).  
Similar to the effects of safety threat, perceptions of an outgroup as a cultural or identity 
threat can influence hostile attitudes and behaviors towards members of that group (Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000). The rise of non-Western immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants more 
specifically is especially considered to be threatening to Western nations that perceive a cultural 
clash between their values and those of the incoming immigrants (Gaudette et al., 2020). These 
threats are even more prominent among those who highly identify with their White identity and 
perceive their culture and norms to be superior to those of other groups. Beyond these threats, 
political, economic, and national security threats were found in the context of both groups, albeit 
in a smaller number of videos.  
While no difference existed between Muslims and immigrants in the context of threat, I 
did find that feminists, relative to immigrants, were more likely to be negatively discussed. 
Though this finding was unexpected, Alt-Right content online does portray gender as a zero-sum 
game between men and women (Waltman & Mattheis, 2017). This might help explain the results 
of the current study as well as other work (Munger & Phillips, 2020) which identifies feminism 
as a common topic within far-right social media. In fact, because this group challenges and is 
seen as threatening to masculinity, critiques of feminism and promoting the manosphere are used 
online in expanding White nationalist ideology on social media (Bjork-James, 2020).  
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Video Information and Identity Data  
 As very little quantitative content analytic data exists on White nationalist social media, I 
examined how these videos were produced as well as the identities of the individuals present. 
This information provides a clearer picture of social media that is created specifically by White 
nationalists on YouTube. First, I found that the majority of the videos in the corpus were 
recorded using a vlog style (e.g., 71%). Although, this is arguably an outcome of the norms 
associated with posting videos on YouTube. However, as vlogs are potentially more personal as 
compared to other video styles and are used to express oneself (Christian, 2009) the significant 
use of this type of recording is important to consider. Second, the data shows that in just under 
one-third of videos (e.g., 29%) outside news coverage was present. Interestingly, one reason 
these videos might feature outside news is to try and legitimize the social media content they are 
creating. Additionally, the use of outside news helps create a context for the various issues or 
topics that are being discussed. This is especially important given the amount of misinformation 
online generally and specifically in far-right social media. Indeed, news in these videos can be 
used and blended with misinformation to create more believable messaging. This has serious 
implications for the potentially harmful narratives individuals might believe as truth when they 
view social media content that might contain misinformation.  
 For the social identities of the people present in the videos I found that the majority of 
individuals were both White (e.g., 100%) and male (e.g., 81%). Of interest, this fits with the 
narrative discussed above that White American males are considered to be the dominant ingroup 
identity for White nationalists. Understanding the identities of those present in White nationalist 
social media is important for a few reasons. Mainly because researchers do not have much 
demographic information about those who self-identify as a White nationalist or part of the Alt-
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Right (e.g., individuals likely to view White nationalist social media; Forscher & Kteily, 2019). 
The data from this analysis could be used in future research to explore whether the identities of 
those who create and are present in the online content match those who are viewing it.   
Political Data 
 Arguably politics and White nationalism are two concepts that are related and intertwined 
(Clark, 2020). Because of this, I investigated the presence of both American political parties and 
key political figures in the corpus of videos. The data show that both the Democratic (57%) and 
Republican (39%) parties were frequently mentioned in White nationalist social media. 
Additionally, Donald Trump (35%), Barack Obama (15%), and Hillary Clinton (13%) were also 
regularly featured in these videos. Altogether, this data points to the fact that in White nationalist 
content online some form of discussion around politics is very common. This is important as 
continued exposure to discussions of politics in these videos is likely to influence viewers' real-
world political attitudes in line with the content. Additionally, depending on how the political 
figures and parties are discussed in these videos it could also have significant implications on 
and influence individuals' voting intentions in current and future elections. Of note, this study 
only coded for the presence of political parties and figures. Future research should further 
explore the valence (e.g., positive or negative) and framing of these political entities to better 
understand how they are discussed within White nationalist social media.    
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 The current study has important limitations that require attention. First, the videos in this 
content analysis represent only a small fraction of the White nationalist content present on 
YouTube. Indeed, data show that this platform is popular and used by many far-right groups 
(Lewis, 2018). Additionally, within the channels analyzed, only a specific number of videos 
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were randomly selected to be coded. However, the amount of data included in the corpus is 
comparable with other content analysis work on this platform (Dale et al., 2017; Krajewski, 
Schumacher, & Dalrymple, 2019). Although this study accomplishes its goal of providing a 
snapshot of White nationalist content on YouTube, future research should continue to explore the 
videos and channels not included in the present corpus. To this point, the variables of interest 
were also only examined on one social media website (e.g., YouTube). As White nationalism is 
present on almost all mainstream (DeCook, 2018; Gaudette et al., 2020; Munger & Phillips, 
2020) and non-mainstream platforms (Lima et al., 2018), future research needs to consider the 
differences that might exist across social media.  
Investigating White nationalist content between platforms could identify themes that cut 
across all social media websites. Additionally, it could identify platforms that might include the 
highest percentage of problematic content. Pairing this knowledge with information from other 
methodologies such as big data (Chen, Nyhan, Reifler, Robertson, & Wilson, 2021) might be an 
especially important area for future research. For example, content analysis paired with big data 
analytics could identify usage trends and themes from a macro perspective and might be 
especially powerful at understanding how specific messages and engagement with specific 
platforms might be most harmful to the individuals who use them.  
Second, when examining the presence and coverage of social identity outgroups I only 
coded for Muslims, immigrants, and feminists. While existing research highlights that these three 
groups are perceived as the most threatening to White nationalists, they are by no means the only 
outgroups to the far-right. Indeed, any individual or group who does not fit the White American 
male demographic is likely considered an outgroup member to White nationalists. Additionally, 
other religious groups (e.g., Judaism) and sexual minorities (e.g., LGBTQ) might also be 
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frequently present and portrayed in negative ways in this content. Future research should 
examine a wider range of social identity outgroups to fully understand how these depictions can 
influence attitudes and behaviors toward minority individuals.   
Third, while content analyses are useful in contributing information about the unique 
messages in a piece of media, they do not provide evidence about how viewing said content 
affects those who watch it. For example, while the finding that SIMCA predictors are present in 
White nationalist YouTube videos is important, it does not provide an effects-based link between 
viewing this content and taking collective action. Indeed, exposure to White nationalist 
narratives or messaging might be an especially powerful mechanism for influencing real-world 
attitudes, emotions, and behaviors. Accordingly, in Study 2 I empirically test the effects of 




























Chapter 7: Study 2 Introduction 
 
Study 1 uses a message system approach to understand the relationship between social 
media and White nationalism. Study 2 builds upon the data collected in Study 1 by investigating 
the predictive influence of participants' self-reported use, engagement, and exposure to pro-
White social media content on real-world attitudes and behaviors. Study 2 employs a unique 
sample by examining these relationships among those who identify as Republican and not Alt-
right, Democrat and not Alt-Right, and Alt-Right. To my knowledge, only one other peer-
reviewed quantitative study has directly sampled those who self-identify as Alt-Right (e.g., 
Forscher & Kteily, 2019). From this we know that those who identify as Alt-Right are 
psychologically different on a wide range of social and political attitudes compared to non-Alt-
Right (Forscher & Kteily, 2019). These differences tend to be related to their explicit and robust 
support for a pro-White ideology. Considering this I propose the following hypotheses for Study 
2. 
H4: Participants who self-identify as Alt-Right will have a stronger Alt-Right identity 
compared to Democrats and Republicans.  
H5: Participants who self-identify as Alt-Right will identify with their White racial 
identity more than Democrats and Republicans.  
Additionally, examining the quantity of viewing pro-White social media for Alt-Right 
participants is important as these individuals are arguably most likely to be exposed to this 
content. Indeed, engagement with pro-White themes on social media is likely predictive of 
radicalization and pro-White attitudes in the real world. However, it is currently unknown how 
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Alt-Right individuals use and engage with social media in similar and different ways as 
Republicans and Democrats, and subsequently how they are different on certain real-world 
beliefs. Because of this I propose the following research questions.  
RQ5: How do Alt-Right individuals compare to Democrats and Republicans with respect 
to their social media use, exposure, and engagement?   
RQ6: How do the Alt-Right individuals compare to Democrats and Republicans with 
respect to their social, political, and policy attitudes?   
Study 2 examines these questions and others through an online survey. Because there is 
little information about how Alt-Right individuals use social media, participants were asked 
about the different ways in which they engage with various social media platforms, websites, and 
apps. Participants were asked about the extent to which they come across references of White 
collective efficacy, White identity, and White injustice, psychological mechanisms proposed by 
the SIMCA model to motivate collective action intentions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008). In line with the propositions of SIMCA, participants were also asked about their 
willingness to participate in online and offline forms of collective actions to benefit White people 
as a group. Considering this I propose the following hypotheses. 
H6a: Self-reported exposure to White injustice on social media will be positively 
associated with participants’ perceptions related to White injustice. 
H6b: Self-reported exposure to White efficacy on social media will be positively 
associated with participants’ attitudes related to collective efficacy. 
H6c: Self-reported exposure to White identity on social media will be positively 
associated with participants’ attitudes related to strength of White identity. 
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H7: Self-reported exposure to White injustice on social media will increase willingness to 
participate in collective actions that benefit Whites via increased perceptions of injustice toward 
Whites and be moderated by political identity.  
Lastly, public opinion data shows that many White Americans (both Republicans and 
Democrats) feel that they are facing discrimination because of their race (Pew Research Center, 
2019). While these individuals feel disenfranchised, they also believe that social outgroups 
(Muslims, feminists, immigrants) are a threat to their dominant status. Given the messaging 
relative to White disenfranchisement and social outgroups, exposure to these groups on social 
media is likely to influence related real-world attitudes. I propose the following hypotheses to be 
examined.  
H8a: Exposure to general content about immigrants on social media will be positively 
associated with increased negative attitudes toward this group. 
H8b: Exposure to general content about Muslims on social media will be positively 
associated with increased negative attitudes toward this group. 
H8c: Exposure to general content about feminists on social media will be positively 
associated with increased negative attitudes toward this group. 
Implications Study 2 
Study 2 makes the following theoretical contributions. First, I provide an empirical 
examination of how self-reported exposure to SIMCA themes on social media influences 
collective action willingness. This is important as I demonstrate a theoretical connection between 
pro-White messaging on digital media and subsequent behaviors motivated to improve Whites’ 
status and position in the U.S. Second, based on existing research (Bjork-James, 2020; Ekman, 
2018; Gaudette et al., 2020), I explore how social media exposure to specific outgroups known to 
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threaten pro-White ideology influences attitudes toward the depicted groups. All of the 
relationships investigated in this study do so in a unique sample made up of Republicans, 
Democrats, and the Alt-Right. One way these individuals might differ is in their exposure 
to/belief in pro-White narratives online. Theoretically, this examination will provide novel data 
on if this difference explains diverging attitudes for members of the different political groups. 
Methodologically, by employing cross-sectional surveys to sample this group and their social 
media use I help provide additional and quantifiable data to what is known from previous 
qualitative studies. Additionally, I provide a methodological foundation for future research on 
this topic that will use experimental and longitudinal methodologies to more completely examine 

































Chapter 8: Study 2 Method 
Participants  
 All participants (N = 740) were from the United States, racially White, and social media 
users. Quotas were specified to recruit participants from each of the political groups of interest. 
Of the 740 participants, 258 self-identified as Republican and not Alt-Right, 239 as Democrat 
and not Alt-Right, and 243 as Alt-Right. Alt-Right participants were considered those who 
identified as Republican and who scored five and above on the identification with Alt-Right 
views scale. This strategy of identifying Alt-Right participants is adapted from previous research 
(e.g., Forscher & Kteily, 2019). Republican and Democrat participants who were not Alt-Right 
were considered those who self-identified as Republican or Democrat respectively and scored a 
four and lower on the identification with Alt-Right views scale. Data were collected from March 
8th through April 12th. All participants received monetary compensation for their participation. 
The median time of completion was 17.75 minutes. Of the 740 participants, 348 identified as 
female and 392 identified as male, Mage = 57.92, SD = 16.32. Most participants reported their 
religion as Christian (N = 578, 79.3%), followed by “None” (N = 74, 10.0%), “Other” (N = 39, 
5.3%), and Judaism (N = 31, 4.2%). No additional individual religions included more than 10 
participants (N = 9, 1.2%).  
Procedure 
 Because Alt-Right participants are highly skeptical and often mistrust academics, all 
individuals read a prompt before answering survey questions. This prompt adapted from 
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Forscher and Kteily (2019) is as follows, “There are a lot of misunderstandings about people’s 
media use and their political attitudes. We want to address this issue. We’ll be asking various 
questions about your political beliefs and your experiences with media. As you answer these 
questions, remember that all your responses are confidential. We'll never reveal who you are. In 
order for us to understand your views accurately, it's important that you answer these questions 
honestly.”  
Materials  
 Demographics. Because little information exists about who individuals are that self-
identify as Alt-Right, participants were asked a series of demographic questions. This included 
sex, age, location in the U.S. (e.g., state), religion, political party and strength of identification 
with that party, political ideology, income, education, living environment classification (e.g., 
urban, rural, etc.), and 2020 Presidential election vote choice.  
 Identification with Alt-Right views. One item was adapted from previous research 
(Forscher & Kteily, 2019) to assess identification with Alt-Right views (e.g., “How often do you 
identify with the views of the Alt-Right?”). Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 
(never) to 7 (always), M = 3.41, SD = 2.12.  
 Strength of identity with the Alt-Right. One item was used to assess how strongly 
participants identify with the Alt-Right (e.g., “How strongly do you identify with the Alt-
Right”). Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly), M = 
2.79, SD = 2.09. 
 Exposure to SIMCA mechanisms on social media.  
Injustice toward Whites on social media. Three items were adapted from previous 
research (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) to assess how often participants see content in 
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which White people are treated unjustly on social media. For example, how often do you see 
content: 1) where Whites are being treated unjustly, 2) in which Whites are experiencing 
injustices because of their race, and 3) in which Whites are being put at a disadvantage because 
of their race. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (most days), M = 
2.30, SD = 1.36,  = .96. 
White Identity on social media. Exposure to positive portrayals of White identity on 
social media was adapted from previous research (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) and 
assessed using two items. Specifically, how often do you see social media content that: 1) 
discusses White identity positively and 2) places importance on White identity. Participants 
responded on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (most days), M = 2.13, SD = 1.31, r = .83. 
White collective efficacy on social media. White collective efficacy on social media was 
assessed using two items and adapted from previous research (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). 
Participants rated their agreement with statements such as: 1) Social media can be used to 
improve the position of Whites in America and 2) Social media can be used to improve the 
image of Whites in America. on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 
M = 3.31, SD = 1.04, r = .88. 
SIMCA related beliefs and attitudes in the real world. 
Strength of White identity. Participants were asked about how strongly they identify with 
their race using three items adapted from previous research (Andreychik & Gill, 2009). 
Participants rated their agreement with statements such as: 1) I identify very closely with White 
people as a group, 2) Being White is an important reflection of who I am, and 3) I’m proud to 
think of myself as a White person. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), M = 3.76, SD = .99,  = .91. 
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Injustice toward White people. Participant’s perceptions of injustice toward White 
people were adapted from previous research (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) and 
assessed with three items. Participants rated their agreement with statements such as: 1) Whites 
are put at a disadvantage in America because of their race, 2) I think the way Whites are treated 
in America is unfair, and 3) Whites regularly experience inequality. Participants responded on a 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), M = 3.01, SD = 1.22,  = .95. 
 White collective efficacy. Two items were adapted from previous research (Glasford & 
Calcagno, 2012) to assess participants' beliefs in White collective efficacy. Participants rated 
their agreement with statements such as: 1) Whites in America can work together to improve 
their status and position in society and 2) Whites can work together to improve their image in 
America. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree), M = 3.81, SD = .84, S1 r = .84. 
Collective action to benefit White people in the real world. Willingness to participate in 
collective actions that explicitly benefit White people was assessed using three items adapted 
from previous research (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012). Participants rated their agreement with 
statements including: 1) I would participate in a demonstration with the goal of improving the 
position of Whites in America, 2) I would sign a petition to stop discrimination against Whites in 
America, and 3) I would participate in raising awareness about injustices facing Whites in 
America. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree), M = 2.90, SD = 1.20,  = .89. 
Collective action to benefit White people using social media. Three items were adapted 
from previous research (Chan 2014; Glasford & Calcagno, 2012) and used to assess participants' 
willingness to use social media to participate in collective actions that explicitly benefit White 
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people. Participants rated their agreement with statements including: 1) I would sign a petition 
online or on social media to stop discrimination against Whites in America, 2) I would like, 
retweet, or upvote a comment that is supportive of Whites as a group, and 3) I would take part in 
online or social media demonstrations with the goal of improving the position of Whites. 
Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), M = 
2.80, SD = 1.23,  = .92.  
 Outgroup measures.  
Exposure to outgroups on social media. Three individual items were used to assess 
generally how often participants reported seeing content about various outgroups on social 
media. For example, how often on social media do you see content about 1) Muslims (M = 2.19, 
SD = 1.26), 2) Feminists (M = 2.38, SD = 1.32), and 3) Immigrants (M = 3.00, SD = 1.50). 
Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (most days). 
Attitudes toward immigrants. Participants' attitudes toward immigrants were adapted 
from previous research (Varela et al., 2013) and assessed using three items. Participants rated 
their agreement with statements such as: 1) Immigrants are a burden on American taxpayers, 2) 
Immigrants in large groups are dangerous, and 3) Immigrants are a threat to national security. 
Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), M = 
3.28, SD = 1.27,  = .94 
 Attitudes toward feminists. Two items adapted from previous research (Fassinger, 1994) 
were used to assess participants' attitudes toward feminists. Participants rated their agreement 
with statements including: 1) Feminist principles should be adopted everywhere and 2) Feminists 
are a menace to this nation and the world. Items were recoded so that higher scores indicated 
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more negative attitudes toward feminists. Participants responded on a scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), M = 2.96, SD = .98, r = .30. 
 Attitudes toward Muslims. Attitudes toward Muslims were assessed using three items 
adapted from previous research (Cottrell, Richards, & Nicholls, 2010). Participants rated their 
agreement with statements such as Muslims: 1) Advocate values that are morally inferior to the 
values of people like me, 2) Promote values that directly oppose the values of people like me, 
and 3) Endanger the physical safety of people like me. Participants responded on a scale ranging 




















Chapter 9: Study 2 Results 
Analysis Plan 
 Most of the variables investigated in this survey were first tested in a smaller and 
exploratory sample to establish their validity. The current data were analyzed with the three 
proposed groups examined as distinctly separate from each other based on the definitions 
specified in the method section. As this dissertation is interested in how Alt-Right, Republican, 
and Democrat participants are similar and different from each other on a wide range of 
individual media and non-media items, a series of one-way ANOVA’s and subsequent post hoc 
tests comparing the means between groups were conducted to examine if there were significant 
mean differences on each measure between Democrats vs. Alt-Right and Alt-Right vs. 
Republicans. Additionally, I was interested in how engagement and use of social media would 
predict various attitudes and behaviors across the political groups. These analyses were carried 
out using a series of GLM ANOVA’s and tests of moderated mediation. For these tests Alt-Right 
participants were used as the reference group.  
Demographic Information 
 As little is known about those who self-identify as Alt-Right I investigated the 
participants reported demographic information for each group (for a full demographic 
breakdown of the variables discussed see Appendix C). Indeed, the results show that for 
Democrat participants most reported their gender as female (52.7%). However, for Republicans 
(53.5%) and Alt-Right (58%), the majority of participants reported their gender as male. In the 
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context of income, Democrat participants reported “$100,000 to $149,999” (22.2%) as their most 
common total income. For Republicans, the most common total income was lower “$25,000 to 
$49,999” (24.8%). Whereas the Alt-Right were most frequently in the middle of the three groups 
“$50,000 to $74,999” (21.0%). Next, for education, Democrats were most likely to list “college 
graduate, four-year degree” (34.7%) as their highest level of education. Republicans most 
frequently listed “some college, but no four-year degree” (32.6%). For Alt-Right participants, an 
equal number of participants reported “some college, but no four-year degree” (25.9%) and “post 
graduate training or professional degree” (25.9%). Lastly, participants were asked about what 
type of environment they currently live in (e.g., rural, suburbs, city). For all three groups, 
Democrats (39.7%), Republicans (37.6%), and Alt-Right (32.1%) most indicated that they 
currently live in a suburban-type area in the U.S. Altogether, this data points to the fact that Alt-
Right participants are both similar and different to those who self-identified as Democrats and 
Republicans depending on the demographic variable considered.  
Comparisons Between Groups 
 Strength of ingroup identities. Hypothesis 4 proposed that Alt-Right participants would 
also have the strongest Alt-Right identity. Indeed, I found that Alt-Right participants reported a 
significantly higher strength of Alt-Right identity as compared to Democrats, p < .001, d = 1.67, 
and Republicans, p <. 001, d = 1.85. No significant difference was found between Democrats 
and Republicans, p > .999. Next, hypothesis 5 stated that Alt-Right participants would more 
highly identify with their Whiteness as compared to Democrats and Republicans. Data indicated 
that Alt-Right participants did have a significantly stronger White identity compared to both 
Democrats, p < .001, d = .99, and Republicans, p < .001, d = .52. Additionally, Republicans were 
also found to have a significantly stronger White identity as compared to Democrats, p < .001, d 
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= .51. To summarize, in the context of dominant identities to the far-right, Alt-Right participants 
to a greater extent than either Democrats or Republicans identify with these aspects (e.g., the Alt-
Right and Whiteness). 
 Differences in social media content across groups. For a full listing of all means for 
each group see Table 4 below. 
Table 4. Means for each group media-related measures 
Measure   Alt-Right Democrats Republicans 
1. Injustice Whites SM  3.0623 1.6713 2.1712          
2. Positive White identity SM 2.5323 2.1613 1.7312          
3. White efficacy SM 3.6023 3.161 3.181          
4. Exposure to feminists SM 2.8323  2.181 2.151          
5. Exposure to Muslims SM         2.6323 1.971 1.981          
6. Exposure to immigrants SM 3.6223 2.5113 2.8712 
 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .05, N = 740. SM = social media. All measures were examined on a 1-5 
scale. 1 = significantly different than Alt-Right, 2 = significantly different than Democrats, 3 = 
significantly different than Republicans.  
 
 RQ 5 asked how Alt-Right individuals generally compare to Democrats and Republicans 
in the context of social media engagement and exposure. Overall, I found differences in the 
themes participants were exposed to in their social media diets based on their ideology. Alt-Right 
participants, for instance, reported significantly higher exposure to injustice toward Whites on 
social media compared to Democrats, p < .001, d = 1.15 and Republicans, p < .001, d = .67. Alt-
Right individuals also reported more exposure to positive portrayals of White identity on social 
media, compared to Democrats, p = .005, d = .27 and Republicans, p < .001, d = .62. Lastly, Alt-
Right participants had higher levels of White collective efficacy on social media compared to 
Democrats, p < .001, d = .41 and Republicans, p < .001, d = .40. 
Next, I examined how these identity groups differed with respect to their exposure to 
outgroups within their social media content. Results revealed that Alt-Right participants reported 
 76 
significantly higher exposure to feminists on social media compared to both Democrats, p < 
.001, d = .50 and Republicans, p < .001, d = .52. Similar patterns were found for Alt-Right 
individuals’ exposure to Muslims on social media compared to Democrats, p < .001, d = .52 and 
Republicans, p < .001, d = .51. Finally, exposure to immigrants on social media was also higher 
for the Alt-right compared to Democrats, p < .001, d = .82 and Republicans p < .001, d = .51. 
Altogether, the results addressing RQ5 indicate that Alt-Right participants are significantly and 
frequently different from Democrats and Republicans in how they use and engage with social 
media as well as the types of content they view.  
 Differences in social and political attitudes and behaviors across groups. For a full 
listing of all means for each group see Table 5 below.  
Table 5. Means for each group non-media related measures 
 
Measure    Alt-Right  Democrats Republicans 
1. Alt-Right identity  4.7623 1.901 1.761          
2. White identity 4.2223 3.2913 3.7812          
3. Injustice toward Whites 3.7523 2.1313 3.1312          
4. White collective efficacy 4.0823 3.5813 3.7612          
5. Collective action offline 3.5023 2.4313 2.7612          
6. Collective action online 3.5323 2.381 2.511          
7. Attitudes toward immigrants 4.0323 2.4113 3.3912          
8. Attitudes toward feminists 3.5323 2.3113 3.0312          
9. Attitudes toward Muslims 3.8023 2.3413 3.0012          
   
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .05, N = 740. All measures were examined on a 1-5 scale. 1 = 
significantly different than Alt-Right, 2 = significantly different than Democrats, 3 = 
significantly different than Republicans.  
 
RQ 6 asked how Alt-Right participants are similar and different to Democrats and 
Republicans in the context of social/ political attitudes and behaviors. Comparisons between 
these groups found that Alt-Right participants were significantly higher than both Democrats and 
Republicans on the mechanisms proposed by SIMCA. This included, White identity as specified 
above, belief in injustice toward Whites, Democrats, p < .001, d = 1.57, Republicans, p < .001, d 
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= .61, and White collective efficacy, Democrats, p < .001, d = .58, Republicans, p < .001, d = 
.40. Further, Alt-Right participants were also significantly more likely to be willing to participate 
in collective actions that explicitly benefit Whites both offline, Democrats, p < .001, d = .91, 
Republicans, p < .001, d = .69, and collective actions online, Democrats, p < .001, d = .98, 
Republicans p < .001, d = .91. 
 With respect to outgroup attitudes, I found that Alt-Right participants had significantly 
higher negative outgroup attitudes compared to both Democrats and Republicans. This included 
attitudes toward immigrants compared to Democrats, p < .001, d = 1.53, and Republicans, p < 
.001, d = .62, attitudes toward feminists, Democrats, p < .001, d = 1.41, Republicans, p < .001, d 
= .57, and attitudes toward Muslims, Democrats p < .001, d = 1.44, Republicans, p < .001, d = 
.80.   
Regressions Examining Social Media’s Predictive Influence 
 Considering the differences between Alt-Right, Democrats, and Republicans, I next 
examined how for each group the media variables discussed above influence social and political, 
attitudes. With a parsimonious analysis in mind, I decided to examine these relationships among 
two contexts. First, I investigated the relationships proposed by the SIMCA model (van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Second, I examined how exposure to outgroups on social 
media (e.g., Muslims, immigrants, feminists) influences attitudes toward these groups. 
 SIMCA relationships. Hypotheses 6a-6c proposed that exposure to the SIMCA 
mechanisms on social media would result in participants being higher in each mechanism (for 
correlations between key variables see Table 6 below). Predictor variables were standardized for 
the following analyses.  
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Table 6. Bivariate correlations for key SIMCA measures 
Measure    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Injustice toward 
Whites on social media  
 -        
2. Positive White 
identity on social media 
 .43**  -       
3. White efficacy on 
social media 
.35** .40**  -      
4. Injustice toward 
Whites 
 .58**  .19** .30** -     
5. White identity  .35**  .23** .36** .47** -    
6. White collective 
efficacy 
 .26**  .30** .43** .28** .46** -   
7. Collective action .53** .38** .45** .62** .50** .39** -  
8. Collective action on 
social media 
.53** .42** .53** .56** .48** .37** .81** - 
 
 
Notes. ** p < .001, * p < .05, N = 740. 
 
SIMCA injustice. Consistent with H6a, there was a significant and positive association 
between exposure to injustice toward Whites on social media and perceptions of injustice toward 
Whites, F (1, 734) = 229.71, b = .44, p < .001, 2p = .24. As discussed above, political groups 
were also significantly different with respect to their perceptions of injustice toward Whites, F 
(2, 734) = 63.70, p < .001, 2p = .15. Specifically, Alt-right participants reported higher 
perceptions of injustice compared to Republicans and Democrats. Each of these comparisons 
were statistically significant (See Table 5 for details). Finally, the interaction between participant 
political identity and exposure to White injustice on social media was significant, F (2, 734) = 
4.42, p = .012, 2p = .01.   
Simple slopes analyses (see figure 6 below) show that exposure to social media content 
was positively and significantly associated with perceptions of injustice for individuals from all 
three political groups (Alt-Right b = .44, p < .001; Republicans b = .54, p < .001; Democrats b = 
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.72, p < .001). A follow up using contrasts to examine the differences in slopes revealed a 
significant effect when comparing Democrats versus Alt-Right, F (1, 734) = 8.84, p = .003, 2p = 
.01 and a marginally significant difference when comparing Democrats versus Republicans, F (1, 
734) = 3.64, p = .057, 2p = .01. Lastly, I found no significant difference when comparing the 
slopes between Republicans and the Alt-Right, F (1, 734) = 1.43, p = .233, 2p = .00. These 
results reveal that the positive association observed between exposure to social media content 
referencing injustices towards Whites and perceptions of injustice towards Whites in the real 
world is similar for Alt-right and Republican individuals. However, this relation between social 
media content about injustice and real-world perceptions of injustice towards Whites is much 
stronger for Democrats when compared to Alt-right and marginally stronger when compared to 
Republicans. 
Figure 6. Relationship between injustice on social media on perceptions of injustice between 
political identity groups 
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SIMCA collective efficacy. Supporting H6b, belief in social media messages about 
collective efficacy were positively associated with collective efficacy attitudes in the real world, 
F (1, 734) = 141.26, b = .33, p < .001, 2p = .16. As discussed before, political groups differed in 
their collective efficacy real world beliefs, F (2, 734) = 13.75, p < .001, 2p = .04. Specifically, 
Alt-Right participants reported statistically higher levels of collective efficacy as compared to 
Democrats and Republicans (see Table 5 for details). The interaction between belief in social 
media messages about collective efficacy and political group was not significant, F (2, 734) = 
.08, p = .924, 2p = .00. An analysis of the simple slopes found a positive and significant 
relationship for belief in collective efficacy on social media with attitudes of collective efficacy 
for all three groups (Alt-Right b = .33, p < .001; Republicans b = .33, p < .001; Democrats b = 
.36, p < .001). However, a comparison of the slopes shows that none of the contrasts between 
political groups were significant, Democrats and Republican, p = .712, Democrats and Alt-Right, 
p = .748, Republicans and Alt-Right, p = .936. This indicates that the positive relationship 
observed between belief in collective efficacy messages in social media and attitudes of 
collective efficacy in the real world are of a similar magnitude for Democrats, Republicans, and 
the Alt-Right.  
SIMCA White identity. Consistent with H6c, exposure to references of White identity on 
social media was positively and significantly associated with identification of White racial 
identity, F (1, 734) = 26.98, b = .23, p < .001, 2p = .04. As noted before, political groups 
significantly differed with respect to White identity, F (2, 734) = 55.50, p < .001, 2p = .04. The 
data show that Alt-Right individuals significantly and more strongly identify with being White 
compared to Democrats and Republicans (see Table 5 for details). The interaction between 
exposure to references of White identity in social media and political group was non-significant, 
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F (2, 734) = 1.01, p = .367, 2p = .00. The test of simple slopes revealed a significant and 
positive relationship between exposure to references of White identity on social media and 
strength of White identity for Alt-Right b = .23, p < .001 and Democrat b = .22, p < .001 
participants. The slope for Republicans was non-significant b = .11, p = .126. The contrasts 
comparing the slopes between political groups found that none were significant, Democrats and 
Republican, p = .250, Democrats and Alt-Right, p = .892, Republicans and Alt-Right, p = .173. 
Altogether the data shows the relation between exposure to White identity references on social 
media and strength of White identity is not significantly different across political groups. 
SIMCA Mediated Moderation.  
Collective action offline. Next, because the SIMCA variables related to injustice 
revealed a significant interaction between exposure to injustice on social media and political 
identity on perceptions of injustice I further explored this relationship (e.g., H7). Using the 
PROCESS macro Model 8 (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) with 5000 bootstrapped samples. I 
examined how exposure to injustice toward Whites on social media (i.e., x) influences 
willingness to participate in collective actions offline that benefit White people (i.e., y) through 









Figure 7. Conceptual model 1 
 
For the multi-categorical moderator Alt-Right participants were treated as the reference 
group. The moderated mediation model comparing Democrats and the Alt-Right was supported 
with a significant index of moderated mediation = .14, SE = .05, 95% CI [.04, .24]. Because the 
confidence interval for this index does not include zero this indicates a significant conditional 
indirect effect when comparing Democrats and the Alt-Right. Indeed, the conditional indirect 
effect for Democrat participants, b = .35, SE = .05, CI [.26, .44] was stronger than for Alt-Right 
participants, b = .21, SE = .04, CI [.14, .29]. The moderated mediation model comparing 
Republicans and the Alt-Right was not found to have a significant index = .05, SE = .04, CI [-
.03, .13]. In other words, the conditional indirect effect for Republican participants, b = .26, SE = 
.04, CI [.19, .33], was not statistically different than the Alt-Right.  
Collective action online. A similar pattern was found for willingness to participate in 


















Figure 8. Conceptual model 2 
 
The comparison between Democrats and the Alt-Right was again supported with a 
significant index of moderated mediation = .11, SE = .04, CI [.03, .20]. This indicates that the 
conditional indirect effect is stronger for Democrats b = .28, SE = .04, CI [.20, .37] as compared 
to the Alt-Right, b = .17, SE = .03, CI [.11, .24]. When comparing Republicans to the Alt-Right 
the moderated mediation index was not significant, = .04, SE = .04, CI [-.03, .11]. Showing that 
Republican participants, b = .21, SE = .03, CI [.15, .28], are not significantly different from the 
Alt-Right.  
 Outgroup attitudes. Based on the data from study 1, hypothesis 8a-8c proposed that 
exposure to content about outgroups (immigrants, Muslims, feminists) on social media will lead 
to increased negative attitudes toward each group (for correlations between key variables see 



















Table 7. Bivariate correlations for key outgroup measures 
Measure    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Immigrant social 
media exposure  
 -       
2. Muslims social 
media exposure 
 .65**  -      
3. Feminist social 
media exposure 
.67** .71**  -     
4. Attitudes toward 
immigrants 
 .25**  .22** .22** -    
5. Attitudes toward 
Muslims 
 .27**  .36** .31** .67** -   
6. Attitudes toward 
feminists 
 .17**  .13* .17** .45** .50** - 
 
Notes. ** p < .001, * p < .05, N = 740. 
 
Immigrants. Referencing H8a, increased exposure to immigrants on social media was 
associated with more negative attitudes toward this group, F (1, 734) = 10.62, b = .17, p = .001, 
2p = .01. Additionally, this data shows a significant main effect for political identity, F (2, 734) 
= 105.71, p < .001, 2p = .22. Specifically, Alt-right participants had more negative attitudes 
about immigrants compared to Republicans and Democrats (see Table 5 for specifics). However, 
the interaction did not reveal a significant relationship between these variables, F (2, 734) = .459, 
p = .632, 2p = .00. An analysis of the simple slopes found a significant and positive slope for 
exposure to immigrants on social media with negative attitudes toward immigrants for 
Republican participants, b = .16, p = .013 and Alt-right participants, b = .17, p = .022. For 
Democrats it was not significant, b = .08, p = .318. An examination comparing the interaction 
slopes for each group showed that none of the contrasts were significant, Democrats and 
Republican, p = .411, Democrats and Alt-Right, p = .388, Republicans and Alt-Right, p = .917.  
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Muslims. Supporting H8b, viewing more content on social media about Muslims was 
related to increased negative attitudes about this group, F (1, 734) = 67.57, b = .37, p < .001, 2p 
= .08. A second significant main effect was also found for political identity, F (2, 734) = 101.91, 
p < .001, 2p = .22. This main effect indicated that Alt-Right participants have significantly more 
negative attitudes toward Muslims compared to Democrats and Republicans (see Table 5 for 
specifics). The interaction was not found to be significant, F (2, 734) = 1.47, p = .231, 2p = .00. 
A further investigation of the interaction slopes revealed a significant and positive relationship 
for exposure to Muslims on social media with negative attitudes toward Muslims for each 
political group (Alt-Right b = .37, p < .001; Republicans b = .34, p < .001; Democrats b = .22, p 
= .003). However, none of the contrasts comparing these interaction slopes between political 
groups were significant, Democrats and Republican, p = .196, Democrats and Alt-Right, p = 
.097, Republicans and Alt-Right, p = .776.  
Feminists. Consistent with H8c, increased viewing of content that included feminists on 
social media was associated with negative attitudes toward this group, F (1, 734) = 5.02, b = .10, 
p =.025, 2p = .01. A significant main effect was also found for political identity, F (2, 734) = 
117.96, p < .001, 2p = .24. Specifically, Alt-right participants reported increased negative 
attitudes toward feminists compared to Republicans and Democrats. (See Table 5 for specifics). 
However, the interaction between these variables was not significant, F (2, 734) = 1.35, p = .259, 
2p = .00. I next examined the interaction slopes and found a significant and positive relationship 
with exposure to feminists on social media for negative attitudes toward feminists in Republican 
participants b = .12, p = .028. For Alt-Right it was marginally significant, b = .10, p = .061. For 
Democrats the slope was non-significant, b = .00, p = .94. Lastly, none of the contrasts 
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investigating the interaction slopes between political groups were significant, Democrats and 

























Chapter 10: Study 2 Discussion 
 Digital media is a powerful influence that can be used by individuals to seek out 
information, spread discourse, connect with others, and form communities (Kuo, 2018). One 
community that engages with social media extensively to help define its identity is the Alt-Right. 
Indeed, social media platforms like Parler (Aliapoulios et al., 2021; Prabhu et al., 2021) and 
websites like 8chan/8kun (Askanius, 2021) were specifically created to cater to those on the far-
right fringe. However, mainstream platforms used by all Americans including, Twitter, Reddit, 
YouTube, and Facebook regularly contain pro-White content and ideas (Gaudette et al., 2020; 
Lewis, 2018). Despite the Alt-Right collective identity and their ideology becoming more visible 
with the presidency of Donald Trump, many Americans are still unaware of who they are and 
what they stand for (Pew Research Center, 2016a). This general lack of information related to 
the Alt-Right likely also contributes to the dearth of academic research on this group (c.f., 
Forscher & Kteily, 2019). Examining this group, in comparison to others, is important as the Alt-
Right have integrated themselves into the larger political and social landscape in the United 
States (Friedersdorf, 2019). 
Critically, no research has directly sampled Alt-Right participants to understand in-depth 
how they use social media, the types of content that they are regularly exposed to, and how they 
compare to other political identities. Study 1 of this dissertation examined the messaging that 
was present in White nationalist digital media (e.g., YouTube videos). Study 2 builds upon Study 
1 by examining how self-reported exposure to pro-White messaging on social media influences 
different attitudes and behaviors. I accomplish this by collecting a sample of White participants 
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who either self-identified as Alt-Right, Republican and not Alt-Right, or Democrat and not Alt-
Right. Employing this unique sample based on existing research (Forscher & Kteily, 2019) 
allows me to theoretically investigate how Alt-Right participants use social media in potentially 
unique ways compared to Democrats and Republicans. 
SIMCA Derived Data   
 Given the recent real-world examples of collective actions perpetuated by the far-right 
(Barrett, Raju, & Nickeas, 2021), I was interested in examining the relation between exposure to 
the SIMCA mechanism themes on social media, beliefs in the SIMCA mechanisms, and 
collective action intentions across Democrats, Republicans, and Alt-Right individuals. Study 2 
results comparing differences in social media exposure to SIMCA themes (e.g., injustice toward 
Whites, White identity, and White collective efficacy) revealed that Alt-Right participants come 
across these themes more so than Democrats and Republicans (see Table 4). In other words, 
those who identify as Alt-Right are more likely to report that on social media they see Whites 
treated unjustly, positive portrayals of White identity, and believe that White people can use 
social media to improve their status.  
Examining exposure to these themes in social media is significant given their potential to 
affect related psychological attitudes and motivate pro-White collective actions (van Zomeren et 
al., 2008). This influence was particularly evident with respect to perceptions of Whites’ being 
treated unjustly. Indeed, not only does viewing online content about White injustice influence 
real-world perceptions of Whites being treated unfairly but it interacts and is significantly 
different across the political groups of interest (e.g., Democrats vs. Republicans vs. Alt-Right). 
The positive relation between exposure to messages referencing White injustice in social media 
and perceptions of Whites being treated unfairly in the real world is the strongest among 
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Democrats, followed by Republicans, and the Alt-Right (see Figure 6). This effect of injustice 
has critical theoretical implications both generally and for collective action subsequently.  
This highlights the robust influence that pro-White social media content can have on 
groups that are not typically associated with far-right attitudes (e.g., White Democrats). For 
example, while Alt-Right individuals had the highest overall exposure to White injustice on 
social media, it is Democrats who when exposed to it have their perceptions of injustice toward 
Whites influenced the most. Theoretically for Democrats increased viewing of certain pro-White 
themes on social media might have harmful consequences that brings their attitudes associated 
with White injustice more closely in line with Republicans and the Alt-Right (see Figure 6). In 
other words, although Democrats are usually unlikely to perceive Whites experiencing injustice, 
when they are exposed to this concept on social media it has the potential to shift their real-world 
beliefs about White injustice. Arguably social media is even more relevant in this context 
considering it is where many people are exposed to pro-White ideas for the first time (DeCook, 
2018). By referencing themes associated with White injustice pro-White groups have the 
potential to radicalize the attitudes of casual viewers in line with those of the Alt-Right. 
The findings relevant to perceptions of injustice are consistent with those reported in 
other research (Dentice & Bugg, 2016; Norton & Sommers, 2011; Pew Research Center, 2019). 
As in the present study, there is a significant percentage of White Americans, irrespective of 
political identification, who feel disenfranchised and treated unfairly. The rise of equity and 
justice for marginalized groups might be perceived as coming at the expense of White Americans 
(Bryan, 2020; Norton & Sommers, 2011). Perceptions of “reverse racism” against Whites is not 
only associated with hostility towards marginalized groups but is also known to influence 
support for policies aimed at helping these groups (e.g., affirmative action; Wilkins et al., 2017).  
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Perceptions of injustice, in turn, are a key psychological mechanism known to influence 
collective actions aimed at improving one’s ingroup status and position in society. Indeed, 
findings from the moderated mediation analysis revealed that exposure to social media injustice 
(proposed predictor) significantly and positively influenced collective action (proposed outcome) 
via perceptions of injustice (proposed mediator). Though this effect was observed for each of the 
political groups, it was the strongest for Democrats. Theoretically, this provides additional 
support for the critical influence that viewing White injustice on social media can have on both 
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., collective action) for each group examined. 
 It might be unlikely that Democrats will participate in actions like the 2017 
Charlottesville Rally. However, the relationships above still have implications for this group as 
well as Republicans and the Alt-right in the context of collective action. This is because exposure 
to certain social media messages (e.g., injustice) have a strong motivational effect on White 
Americans’ collective action willingness. In other words, certain types of digital media use could 
lead to further trends of individuals participating in actions to benefit their ingroup. Conceptually 
the role social media plays in this context is critical as a predictor (exposure to injustice on social 
media). But it might also be important as an outcome. For example, digital media can provide 
additional opportunities for action (Bimber, 2017). Especially if in-person forms of collective 
action are particularly costly (Pulver et al., 2021).  
Additionally, while the effect was strongest for Democrats this should not take away 
from the finding that for Republicans and the Alt-Right there was also a significant mediating 
relationship of social media on willingness to participate in collective action. Indeed, this might 
especially be important to these two groups given the recent and actual examples of far-right 
collective action carried out and facilitated by social media (Cellan-Jones, 2021). To summarize, 
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there is a strong indication that exposure to White injustice on social media is what motivates 
some White Americans to go out and participate in action. Although perceptions of White 
injustice/discrimination are distorted from reality, this is unimportant. This is because it is 
something that these individuals perceive to be true. I show that this feeling is influential, and 
that White Americans belief in it affects collective action in similar patterns as actual 
marginalized groups (Schmuck & Tribastone, 2020). 
The relationships discussed above are important as study 1 data showed that injustice was 
the mechanism most prevalent in social media (e.g., YouTube videos). This is the first study to 
establish a theoretical connection between viewing social media, belief in SIMCA psychological 
mechanisms, and collective action willingness in a pro-White context for Democrats, 
Republicans and the Alt-Right. These results further extend the situations in which the SIMCA 
model (van Zomeren et al., 2008) is conceptually relevant and can be used to help explain the 
role that social media plays in motivating all White Americans, regardless of political identity, to 
engage in various types of pro-White collective action. Altogether, the effect of social media in 
this situation is important as the data from Study 1 and Study 2 indicate that digital media acts as 
both a platform for the message (injustice toward Whites) and a predictor that indirectly 
influences collective action behaviors. 
While White identity and collective efficacy are mechanisms also proposed by SIMCA to 
be influential at affecting collective action, the data from this dissertation did not show that the 
influence was uniquely different across political groups. In the context of White collective 
efficacy, each group experienced a significant and positive relationship between collective 
efficacy on social media and beliefs about collective efficacy in the real word. A similar pattern 
was also found for viewing positive representations of White identity on social media and 
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strength of White identity (minus the significant relationship for Republicans). Given the 
magnitude of these relationships were roughly similar across groups and the interaction between 
social media and political identity on both outcomes were not statistically significant, I choose to 
not further examine their influence as I did with injustice (e.g., moderated mediation). Based on 
the analyses above it is unlikely that they would have influenced collective action in 
meaningfully different ways across Democrats, Republicans and the Alt-Right (e.g., when 
moderated by political identity). Although, it is critical for future research to examine situations 
in which mechanisms like collective efficacy and White identity might be different for White 
Americans and lead to differing motivations to engage in collective action.  
Finally, not only were the mean differences between groups for individual measures 
relative to the SIMCA model significant, but they were also large. Indeed, when comparing 
Democrats and the Alt-Right, effects sizes as indicated by Sawilowsky (2009) and Cohen (1988) 
that reached the large threshold included exposure to injustice toward Whites on social media, 
belief in injustice toward Whites, and willingness to engage in collective actions both offline and 
online. For the comparisons between the Alt-Right and Republicans, only willingness to 
participate in collective action online was considered large. Altogether the compelling number of 
effect sizes that reached a medium or large threshold indicates that in the context of SIMCA 
mechanisms and outcomes the mean differences for individual measures between the Alt-right 
and Democrats/Republicans are drastic and robust.  
Social Identity Outgroup Data 
As White males are considered to be the dominant ingroup to the Alt-Right and White 
nationalists, I examined how participants' self-reported exposure to outgroups on social media 
would influence their attitudes toward the depicted groups. For each outgroup (immigrants, 
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Muslims, feminists) increased viewing of content related to these groups on social media was 
positively associated with negative attitudes. This is especially reflected in Alt-Right and 
Republican participants considering their slopes were positive and significant (or marginally 
significant) between viewing content about each outgroup on social media and negative attitudes. 
For Democrats the slope was only significant in the context of Muslims. However, when 
comparing contrasts across the respective political groups none of the slope comparisons were 
found to be statistically different/significant.  
More broadly these relationships indicate that the influence of viewing social media 
content about outgroups is not just staying in the digital world but rather is bleeding into how 
individuals negatively think about them in real life. Negative outgroup attitudes are important as 
existing research shows that when White individuals consider a group to be a threat to their 
dominant status, they are more likely to adopt/support more conservative policies (Craig & 
Richeson, 2014a; 2014b). Further identifying these references within media is critical as 
exposure to negative representations can influence real-world behaviors that are harmful towards 
marginalized groups (Hawkins et al., 2021). 
The results relevant to these specific outgroups could be partly explained by existing 
research which shows stereotyped far-right narratives about Muslims, immigrants, feminists are 
especially common on traditional social media platforms (Bjork-James, 2020; Gaudette et al., 
2020). This is also supported from data in Study 1 which examined the messaging around the 
three specific outgroups in White nationalist social media. Though the groups examined (e.g., 
Muslims, immigrants, and feminists) are distinct from each other in important ways, results from 
the current dissertation reveal that each of these groups tends to be referenced in a similar 
negative light within pro-White social media.  
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Demographic Information 
 Much is unknown about individuals who identify as Alt-Right (Forscher & Kteily, 2019). 
Because of this, general demographic information and comparisons to other groups (Democrats 
and Republicans) are important (see Appendix C for further details). I found that the income 
category that had the highest percent of Alt-Right participants was in between Democrats (higher 
average income than Alt-Right) and Republicans (lower average income than Alt-Right). For 
education, Alt-Right participants most commonly selected both the “some college, but no four-
year degree” and “post graduate training or professional degree” options. In the context of 
education and income, this data roughly maps on to information identified by existing research. 
Indeed, Forscher and Kteily (2019) found that for Alt-Right participants a majority (57%) 
reported their education combined as some college or college and beyond. The demographic 
information collected builds upon this existing research by also examining what type of 
environment they currently live in (e.g., rural, suburbs, city). Results revealed that the suburbs 
are the area most listed by Alt-Right, Democrats, and Republicans. This is of interest as rural 
areas are generally considered to be more strictly conservative (Pew Research Center, 2018).  
Altogether, this demographic information has important implications for both pollsters 
and political scientists. Indeed, one common narrative in both the 2016 and 2020 Presidential 
elections was the inaccuracies related to Donald Trump and the nationwide polls (Blumenthal et 
al., 2017). In short, the polls often underestimated the popularity of Donald Trump. While there 
are various theories related to this (Blumenthal et al., 2017; Kurtzleben, 2020), it is possible that 
Alt-Right support for Donald Trump and the pollster’s inability to accurately access this group 
was an issue. Using a nationally representative sample, Forcher and Kteily (2019) find that by 
applying the most conservative estimates 5% of Trump voters identify as Alt-Right. However, 
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this number is potentially and likely much higher. Because the Alt-Right is hard to access, if they 
make up a medium percent of Donald Trump’s voting base then this could potentially skew the 
polls. This highlights the continued importance of understanding who the Alt-Right are and 
being able to accurately sample them in nationwide surveys. By providing additional information 
about the demographic identities of the Alt-Right this study has practical significance to those 
interested in polling and accessing this group.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study has important limitations that require attention. First, this survey employed a 
cross-section methodology to examine the relationships discussed above. This methodology was 
chosen given the difficulty of sampling the Alt-Right as well as the ethical complications of 
experimentally exposing participants to Alt-Right or White nationalist social media content. 
Because of the cross-sectional nature of this study, I am unable to make any causal claims about 
the data or with certainty establish the direction of influence between social media predictors and 
offline attitudes and behaviors. With this limitation in mind future research should use other 
methodologies to explore the connections examined in this study. For example, ethically 
conducted experimental research could establish short-term causal relationships between 
exposure to SIMCA themes in White nationalist social media, beliefs in these mechanisms, and 
subsequent collective action behaviors that benefit White Americans. Exposing Democrat, 
Republican, and Alt-Right participants to examples of White injustice from social media (as 
compared to a control video or stimulus) could theoretically increase perceptions of White 
injustice and subsequent collective action behaviors as proposed by the cross-sectional data. 
Additionally, longitudinal methods would also be useful in this context. Longitudinal 
studies that survey Alt-Right participants would allow researchers to investigate the long-term 
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consequences of exposure to White nationalist social media. Currently, information on these 
long-term effects does not exist. Arguably viewing White nationalist social media over time 
might have additive effects, or individuals might eventually reach some type of ceiling. 
However, further data is needed to understand this fully. Experimental and longitudinal 
methodologies would also be helpful to more concretely explore the moderated mediating 
relationships proposed in the current research. 
Second, this study only sampled participants who self-identified as racially White. 
Although most who identify with the Alt-Right are likely White, other racial and ethnic groups 
might have members who also identify with certain aspects of this movement. For instance, some 
Latinx individuals are part of far-right organizations such as the Proud Boys (Almada, 2017). 
Future research should examine the role of those who are not racially White in far-right groups. 
Related to this, the data in this survey was collected using convenience sampling and was not 
nationally representative. Employing a nationally representative sample and including Alt-Right 
participants is difficult (Forscher & Kteily, 2019) and requires extensive resources that were 
outside the scope of this project. As understanding who the Alt-Right are is important future 
research should use samples that approximate the general population of the United States. The 
fact that the sample was only from the United States is also a limitation. Far-right and pro-White 
ideology is not unique to the U.S. Indeed, existing research has explored how White people 
throughout Europe also identify with far-right ideology (Ali, 2021; Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015; 
Mulhall & Khan-Ruf, 2021). As the underlying mechanisms that influence White individuals in 
Europe and the U.S. are likely related, future research should explore these relationships and 
similarities across Western countries.  
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Third, similar to Study 1 only data related to three specific outgroups (e.g., Muslims, 
immigrants, and feminists) were explored in this survey. This is because these three groups are 
considered the biggest threat to the Alt-Right and the White nationalist ideology. However, these 
are not the only outgroups to the far-right. Future research should explore participants' self-
reported exposure to social media and attitudes toward a wider range of social outgroups. Fourth, 
all constructs assessed in the current research were based on self-report. Self-report data in the 
context of media can be problematic as individuals can sometimes report their media use in 
inaccurate ways (Prior, 2013). Continued research should explore the most effective ways to 
record participants' media use. Self-report data is also a limitation when assessing collective 
action. Because collective action is difficult to measure (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) 
many rely on either intentions or attitudes. This can be problematic as these might not always 
translate to actual collective actions. Future research should examine the relationships in this 
study using behavioral measures which more accurately map onto this construct.  
Lastly, the present research examined media use and exposure strictly in the context of 
social media. While data from both studies show that this is a relevant predictor for pro-White 
attitudes, it is likely not the only one. Indeed, the role that mobile communication has in allowing 
individuals to access far-right content should not be ignored. Further, mobile communication 
might be especially important to consider when examining outcomes like collective action. For 
example, accessing social media platforms on mobile devices can allow users to coordinate with 
others in real time when engaging in various forms of far-right collective action. Both micro 
coordination (Ling & Yttri, 1999), and violent collective action (Bailard, 2015) using mobile 
phones have previously been examined. However, this has not been applied to White nationalism 
and recent examples of far-right collective action. To further understand the unique influence 
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that mobile communication might have future research should explore how these devices allow 
White nationalists to interact digitally while actively participating in collective action.  
Conclusion of Study 2 
 Altogether, Study 2 makes a significant theoretical contribution by identifying that 
participant exposure to pro-White themes on social media influences real-world attitudes and 
behaviors. Additionally, I extend the research in this area by examining these relationships using 
a unique sample of Democrats, Republicans and the Alt-Right. This is important as is it allows 
for a comparison with a group who is often directly associated with the White nationalist 
movement. As Study 1 indicates, far-right social media generally focuses on a strong pro-White 
narrative. However, both general exposure to these themes within digital media and the influence 
they have on participants real-world beliefs might be theoretically different across political 
identities. For example, in the present research Alt-Right participants reported higher overall 
exposure to pro-White SIMCA themes on social media compared to the other two groups. While 
viewing White injustice on social media was found to influence willingness to engage in 
collective action to benefit Whites for all three political identities, the effect was strongest for 
Democrats. This highlights the theoretical significance of social media content and the 
robustness of pro-White feelings in the United States for many. Just like how the growing spread 
of White supremacy cannot be solely attributed to social media, it also cannot be attributed to a 
single political identity or group (the Alt-Right). Rather as this study identifies, pro-White 
attitudes and White supremacy is a systemic issue that needs to be addressed in a multifaceted 
way.    
Practical Implications Across Studies 
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 In addition to the important theoretical extensions, this research also makes a significant 
practical contribution. Public opinion data identifies rising support and actions taken by White 
nationalists in the U.S. as a reason for concern (Mehta, 2019). Additionally, public and private 
think tanks continue to explore the presence and activities of the far-right and White nationalists 
in the U.S. For example, the Southern Poverty Law Center has identified that White nationalist 
groups are growing (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2020) and the Anti-Defamation League has 
investigated how these groups are increasingly using propaganda (Anti-Defamation League, 
2019; 2021). Data from the Study 1 content analysis can be practically used by think tank 
organizations to help explain why pro-White groups are growing and also how they are using 
propaganda. 
Indeed, one reason these groups are experiencing growth is that many White Americans 
are concerned about the threats to their dominant status (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; 2014b) as 
well as the threats that outgroups generally pose. My data supports this by showing narratives 
about outgroups, and their potential threat, are being regularly pushed on social media. This has 
implication as exposure to this content could contribute to negative outgroup beliefs as identified 
in Study 2. Additionally, the data from Study 1 on the presence of mechanisms that motivate 
collective action supports and helps explain the findings from the Anti-Defamation League 
(Anti-Defamation League, 2019; 2021). Lastly, the methods used in this study could be useful to 
think tank organizations, as currently they very rarely investigate what is in the social media 
content that White nationalist and far-right groups are creating and producing themselves online. 
Further understanding of the messages in this social media could help think tanks design 
interventions to reduce the effects of radicalization and misinformation and identify harmful 
content that individuals should avoid.  
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Final Summarization 
 Overall, the goal of these two studies was to more completely understand the relationship 
between social media and the growing pro-White trend in the United States (Anti-Defamation 
League, 2021; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2020). Many have argued that social media is 
facilitating the rise in far-right movements in the U.S. and across Europe. Previous research has 
used social network analysis (Lewis, 2018), qualitative methods (DeCook, 2018), and big data 
approaches (Chen, Nyhan, Reifler, Robertson, & Wilson, 2021). However, data that both 
quantitatively content analyzes White nationalist social media (Study 1) and directly examines 
individuals’ exposure to pro-White themes on social media (Study 2) is lacking. While many 
important concepts both psychological and media-related were explored in this dissertation, 
arguably the examination of collective action is most timely.  
Indeed, the start of this project was directly situated in between two recognizable and 
deadly examples of collective action (the 2017 Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville and the 
2021 U.S. Capitol riot). Critically both forms of action were racially motivated by White 
supremacy and have some connection to social media. The Unite the Right rally made the Alt-
Right nationally and internationally recognizable and forced many of their interactions online. 
The Capitol riot was planned, facilitated, and coordinated using social media (Cellan-Jones, 
2021; Frenkel, 2021). Consequently, the role of pro-White themes on social media cannot be 
ignored in this context. As this dissertation shows, social media can act as a platform for 









Appendix A: Coding Scheme for Study 1 
Coding Scheme  
Unit of Analysis: YouTube video. No commercials, December 12, 2019. 30 min time cut off. 
Corpus: 20 YouTube videos from 5 pro-White channels. 
Variables to code: 
Total number of people in the video: List number 
Video Style- (Interview/personal vlog/public/no video just audio) 
Use info graphics, graphs or charts (Yes/No) 
Show outside news media coverage (Yes/No) 
Male in video- (Yes/No) 
Female in video- (Yes/No) 
Trans male in video- (Yes/No) 
Trans female in video- (Yes/No) 
Is Feminism mentioned?- (Yes/No) 
What was the valence of coverage related to feminism if mentioned (Positive/Negative/Neutral) 
White-European individual in video- (Yes/No) 
Non-White individuals in video- (Yes/No)  
Mention Immigrants or Immigration or migration- (Yes/No) 
List immigrant groups mentioned 
List threats mentioned by immigration or migration 
 102 
Mention Muslims or Islam- (Yes/No) 
List threats mentioned by Muslims or Islam 
SIMCA related codes 
Republican party mentioned- (Yes/No)  
Democratic party mentioned- (Yes/No) 
Donald Trump mentioned- (Yes/No) 
Barack Obama mentioned- (Yes/No) 
Hillary Clinton mentioned- (Yes/No) 
Mention collective action or taking action- (Yes/No) 
Mention injustice or unfair treatment of Whites- (Yes/No) 
Mention injustice or unfair treatment of minorities- (Yes/No) 
Do they mention that they themselves are being treated unfairly or are being attacked- (Yes/No) 
Mention collective White efficacy- (Yes/No) 
Mention White identity- (Yes/No) 
Mention Whites under threat - (Yes/No) 





















Appendix B: Codebook for Study 1 
Codebook 
 
Total number of individuals: 
Write down the total number of individuals in the video- These should be considered people that 
have speaking roles or who are being interviewed as part of the video.  
Video Information: 
Video Style (Interview/personal vlog/public)- Choose which option the video style is. A 
interview would involve more then one person in the video and is generally a structured 
conversation where one participant asks questions, and the other provides answers (Merriam-
Webster, n.d.). A personal vlog would involve only one individual in the video and often entails 
that person speaking into a camera about what is going on in their lives or about a certain topic.  
Or does the video take place out in public at some type of rally or event or at some type of 
conference.  
Use info graphics, graphs or charts (Yes/No)- Info graphics are a way to visually represent data 
in a video. This also include graphs or charts that are being used to try and get their point across 
or to make data easier to understand.  
Show outside news media coverage (Yes/No)- In the video do they show clips or embed clips 
from other forms of news? This could include news reports or news stories or potentially other 
news related YouTube clips. This can also include still shots from online newspaper sources and 
television news.  
Male/Female: 
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 Gender presentation “Refers to the external appearance, dress, mannerism, and behavior through 
which each individual presents their gender identity, or the gender they want to appear as. 
Gender presentation may change, for example, a Drag King may present as a male during his 
performance, but as a female in her daily life.” (positive space network) 
Biological sex “Our biological sex is how we are defined as female, male, or intersex. It 
describes our internal and external bodies — including our sexual and reproductive anatomy, our 
genetic makeup, and our hormones. (Planned Parenthood). 
Male- The individual is male. 
Female- The individual is female. 
Trans male- Those who were assigned female at birth but who now identify as male. 
Trans female- Those who were assigned male at birth but who now identify as female 
Feminist groups or individuals- Feminism is a range of social movements, political movements, 
and ideologies that aim to define, establish, and achieve the political, economic, personal, and 
social equality of the sexes. 
Race: 
Modern scholarship views racial categories as socially constructed, that is, race is not intrinsic to 
human beings but rather an identity created, often by socially dominant groups, to establish 
meaning in a social context. Different cultures define different racial groups, often focused on 
the largest groups of social relevance, and these definitions can change over time. 
White individual- "White" refers to a person having origins in any of the original peoples 
typically of Europe, It includes people who indicated their race(s) as "White" or reported entries 
such as German, Italian, British or Caucasian (U.S. Census, 2010). Additionally can be thought 
of as someone who is perceived to be White based on his or her skin color.    
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Non-White individuals- Are individuals present physically in the video who do not meet the 
criteria of White individuals above. Examples could include people who would be perceived as 
Black, Asian, Latino, Arab, etc.  
Immigration and Immigrants:  
Considering this from a U.S. context, immigration is the international movement of people to a 
destination country of which they are not natives or where they do not possess citizenship in 
order to settle or reside there, especially as permanent residents or naturalized citizens, or to take 
up employment as a migrant worker or temporarily as a foreign worker. Immigrants would then 
be the individuals who are engaging in immigration and are immigrating to the United States.  
Immigrants or Immigration- The individuals speaking in the video mention the words or discuss 
immigration or immigrants or people trying to immigrate or come into the United States. This 
could also include imagery or immigrants entering the U.S.  
List immigrant groups- If people in the video mention immigration or immigrants do they 
mention or reference any specific groups of immigrants? If so list the groups that are mentioned 
with immigration.  
Threats of immigration- If immigration or immigrants is mentioned do the individuals discuss 
any threats related to immigration? Examples of this could include national security threats, 
public safety threats, political threats, economic threats, cultural and identity threats. List the 
threats that are mentioned concerning immigration.  
Islam and Muslims: 
A follower of the religion of Islam, a Muslim is one who believes in god and that Muhammad 
was the supreme messenger of god” (Arab-American anti discrimination committee).  
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Muslims or Islam- The individuals speaking in the video mention the words or discuss Muslims 
or Islam. This can include discussions of Muslims in the Middle East, in European countries or 
the United States.   
Threats related to Muslims- If Muslims or Islam is mentioned do the individuals discuss any 
threats related to these? Examples of this could include national security threats, public safety 
threats, political threats, economic threats, cultural and identity threats. List the threats that are 
mentioned. 
SIMCA Related codes  
Politics: 
A political movement is a social group that operates together to obtain a political goal, on a local, 
regional, national, or international scope. Political movements develop, coordinate, promulgate, 
revise, amend, interpret, and produce materials that are intended to address the goals of the base 
of the movement. A social movement in the area of politics can be organized around a single 
issue or set of issues, or around a set of shared concerns of a social group. 
Republican party- The individuals in the video mention the republican party explicitly, the GOP, 
conservatives or the right. 
Democratic party- The individuals in the video mention the democratic party, liberals or the left.  
Donald Trump- The individuals in the video mention Donald Trump in any way or show 
imagery of him, this can include political slogans associated with Donald Trump (make America 
great again) 
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Barack Obama- The individuals in the video mention Barack Obama in any way or show 
imagery of him, this can include political slogans associated with Barack Obama (change we can 
believe in).  
Hillary Clinton- The individuals in the video mention Hillary Clinton in any way or show 
imagery of her, this can include political slogans associated with Hillary Clinton (I’m with her).   
Collective Action: 
A group member engages in collective action any time that he or she is acting as a representative 
of the group and where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as 
a whole (Wright et al., 1990). It could also include the attitudinal support for protest as well as 
the protest intentions or behaviors of members of a social group that are directed at removing the 
perceived underlying causes of the group’s disadvantage or problem (e.g., signing a petition, 
participating in a demonstration). 
Collective action or taking action- The individuals in the video discuss that Whites need to take 
collection action as a group or they discuss examples of when Whites have taken collective 
action or how Whites can take collective action as described by the definition above.  
Injustice/Unfair Treatment: 
Injustice is generally aroused by perceptions of unfair treatment or outcomes. Feelings of 
injustice tend to be based on subjective perceptions of group-based inequity (i.e., some inequality 
or disadvantage that is perceived as illegitimate). “I think the way we are treated by [out-group] 
is unfair,” and “I feel angry because . . . .” Could also be considered as Whites being at a  
disadvantage. In the video they mention Whites as being disadvantaged or having a disadvantage 
that they are working against. This can be from a very general standpoint or it can be about other 
groups i.e. increasing immigration is going to put Whites at a disadvantage. They might also give 
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specific examples or case studies or talk about things happening in the news where they give 
examples of White individuals being treated unfairly.  
Injustice or unfair treatment of Whites- The individuals in the video mention that Whites are 
suffering injustice or that Whites are being treated unfairly based on the definition described 
above.  
Injustice or unfair treatment of minorities- The individuals in the video mention that minorities 
are suffering injustice or that minorities are being treated unfairly based on the definition 
described above.  
Efficacy: 
Conceptually, efficacy refers to a sense of control, influence, strength, and effectiveness to 
change a group-related problem. “To what extent do you think that this [collective action] will 
increase chances of the government changing their plans?” and, “I think that together we can 
change [the group-related problem].” 
White collective efficacy- The individuals in the video talk about White efficacy or the extent that 
Whites working together can change injustice or discrimination or bias towards their group.  
Identity:  
Social identity is traditionally defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives 
from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her] membership of a social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” 
(Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). 
White identity- In the video, they mention the concept of Whites having an identity as described 
above or they discuss White identity. They could also frame this is Whites having a certain 
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membership or some type of affiliation with each other, this could also be mentioned as White's 
identity is being attacked.  
Threat: 
Whites under threat- In the video they mention in anyway that either Whites as individuals or 
that Whites as a group are under threat. This threat can either be more abstract such as 
immigration affecting the economy in the U.S. or more direct such as immigration will lead to 
more crime in Whites neighborhoods. Might also sound something like the individuals 
mentioning that Whites are being threatened.  



































Appendix C: Demographic variables 
 
 
Figure C1. Gender percent breakdown by political identity group.  
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